KOTA
KINABAlU: James Chin have rejected Project SAMA’s and other Malayan- based
NGOs’ suggestion that Sabah and Sarawak should be allocated 35% of the seats in
Dewan Negara rather than Dewan Rayat.
He said this
proposition is yet another evidence of Malaya-based organisations’ lack of
understanding of the Borneo states’ historical grievances and claim to
one-third of parliament seats in both Houses.
According to
Prof James Chin, the leading scholar of contemporary Sabah and Sarawak, there
are numerous reasons why Sabah and Sarawak should reject the Dewan Negara
proposal, which he describes as a “trick” to maintain the status quo. He
provided five key reasons why the Borneo states must reject the suggestions and
insist on 1/3 seats in both House of Parliament.
First, the
Dewan Negara has minimal political legitimacy in Malaysian politics because it
is a totally appointed House. Its
members are not directly elected by the populace.
That is why,
for many years, debates in the Dewan Negara have received less attention than
those in the Dewan Rakyat. Furthermore, many of individuals nominated to Dewan
Negara are viewed as ‘reward’ for post-political service.
Hence the
significant number of retired politicians in the Dewan Negara.
Second, all
major legislations are introduced in the Dewan Rakyat, where the actual
discussion occurs. The Dewan Negara only debates laws enacted by the Dewan
Rakyat and hence lacks the legislative authority to block significant bills.
Third, all
major political players, including the prime minister, his deputies, and the
majority of ministries, are from the Dewan Rakyat. Ministers from Dewan Negara
are commonly regarded as “backdoor” ministers because they are appointed to the
Dewan Negara in order to serve as ministers. This alone demonstrates that the
political establishment views the Dewan Rakyat as more significant than the
Dewan Negara.
Fourth, in
practice, the Dewan Negara has no real power to block laws other than to delay
them. The one-third seats are designed to restore Sabah and Sarawak’s ability
to block constitutional amendments if they disagree with Malaya.
Fifth, it is
clear that the original intention of the framers of the Constitution wanted
Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak to hold a veto over Malaya. This is to
ensure that Malaya cannot alter the Federal constitution at will.
Under para 19
of the IGC report it states:
Federal
Legislature
(1) Two members of the Senate should be elected for each Borneo State in
accordance with Article 45 (1) (a) of the Constitution. Article 45 (1) (b) of
the Constitution should be amended to increase the number of appointed members
of the Senate by six in respect of the accession of North Borneo and Sarawak to
Malaysia.
An assurance should be given that, on the
occasion of the first appointments of these additional members after Malaysia
Day, at least two would be appointed from North Borneo and at least two from
Sarawak after consultation with the Chief Minister of the State concerned.
(2) Article 46
(1) should be amended to increase the number of elected members of the House of
Representatives from one hundred and four to one hundred and fifty-nine
(including the fifteen proposed for Singapore). Of the additional members
sixteen should be elected in North Borneo and twenty-four in Sarawak.
The proportion
that the number of seats allocated respectively to Sarawak and to North Borneo
bears to the total number of seats in the House should not be reduced (except
by reason of the granting of seats to any other new State) during a period of
seven years after Malaysia Day without the concurrence of the Government of the
State concerned, and thereafter (except as aforesaid) shall be subject to
Article 159 (3) of the existing Federal Constitution (which requires Bills
making amendments to the Constitution to be supported in each House of
Parliament by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of
members of that House).
Under The
Malaysia Agreement 1963, Chapter 3 para 9, it states:
(i) The House
of Representatives shall consist of one hundred and fifty-nine elected members.
(2) There shall be—
(a) one hundred and four member from the States of Malaya ;
(b) sixteen
members from Sabah ;
(c) twenty-four members from Sarawak ;
(d) fifteen members from Singapore.
It was clear
that Singapore, (Sabah) North Borneo and Sarawak did not want Malaya to
dominate Parliament in respect of Constitutional amendments. In the MSCC notes
and Cobbold Report, it was made clear that the peoples of North Borneo and
Sarawak was of the view that Malaya should not dominate the new federation.
Thus, under the
formula, the parliamentary seats in the proposed Malaysian Federation was
distributed to ensure that Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak had veto power by
ensuring that they had slightly more than one third of the seats in Parliament.
Malaya: 104; Sabah: 16; Sarawak: 24 and Singapore: 15
104 : 55 ------à 65%
: 35%
When Singapore
left the Federation in 1965, its 15 Parliamentary seats out of the 159 were not
redistributed to Sarawak or Sabah. This was a historical error that needs to be
rectified. As time went by, the number of Parliamentary seats of Malaya grew to
more than two third of the total Malaysia Parliament seats.
Prof Chin hopes
that the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak understands the proper context of asking
for 1/3 of the seats in Parliament and not be fooled by NGOs in Malaya who have
their own agenda.
Prof James Chin
is the leading authority of political developments in Sabah and Sarawak and the
most cited-scholar on East Malaysian politics. A Sarawakian, he is currently a
professor of Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania, Australia.
