The Petronas Subsidiaries Case

The Petronas Subsidiaries Case: Federal-State AG Roles and MA63 Judicial Autonomy

This case is only nominally about service of papers and which AG sits in court. Substantively, it is about who controls hydrocarbons governance in Sarawak: Malaya or Sarawak.

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1. Why Petronas Is Fighting This So Hard

Petronas is not defending RM120m. That amount is irrelevant.

Petronas is defending a precedent:

If Sarawak’s DGO is upheld, then Petronas is no longer the uncontested monopoly over downstream gas inside Sarawak.

Once that happens:

 • Sarawak can license, regulate, and penalise gas distributors.

 • Petronas becomes just another commercial operator subject to state law.

 • Every future gas project must go through state regulatory compliance, not just federal fiat.

That is an existential shift for Petronas’ business model.

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2. Why the Federal AG’s Position Aligns With Petronas

On paper, the federal Attorney-General is meant to be neutral. In practice, the record tells a more interesting story.

Factually:

 • Federal AG’s Chambers supported Petronas’ procedural position.

 • Federal counsel wrote to the court indicating no objection to the judicial review.

 • Federal counsel argued the federal AG is the sole guardian of public interest.

These positions are reflected in the court record.

Whether this amounts to “non-neutrality” is interpretation. But the effect is unmistakable: the federal AG’s submissions defend centralised legal authority, not Sarawak’s statutory autonomy.

In other words, the federal AG’s legal stance happens to protect exactly the same structure that Petronas depends on.

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3. Why Sarawak Is Framing the Fight as Constitutional

Sarawak’s legal strategy is extremely deliberate:

They are not rushing to argue that the DGO is valid.

They are doing something far more dangerous:

They are challenging who even has the right to define the battlefield.

Their real argument is this:

“Before you decide whether the DGO is lawful, decide who represents the public interest in state law.”

If the court accepts that:

 • The State Attorney-General is constitutionally independent.

 • The federal AG is not automatically the guardian of state public interest.

Then everything changes downstream:

 • Sarawak controls its own enforcement.

 • Federal agencies lose automatic legal authority over state statutes.

 • State regulatory autonomy becomes judicially real, not political rhetoric.

This is not a gas case anymore.

This is jurisdictional warfare.

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4. How This Ties Back to MA63 and the IGC

This is where history comes back to collect its unpaid debts. This is where it gets politically radioactive.

The Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) Report of 1962 did not treat Sabah and Sarawak as administrative provinces. It envisioned:

 • Separate legal systems.

 • Separate public interest guardians.

 • Real autonomy in legal governance.

Putrajaya ignored this for 60 years.

Sarawak is now re-litigating MA63 in court, one doctrine at a time.

Not by grand speeches. By technical procedural fights that reshape precedent.

This is actually more dangerous to federal control than any political rally.

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5. Why This Is a Lose-Lose Situation for Malaya

Malaya has only two options:

Option A: Win the Case

They:

 • Centralise legal authority

 • Reassert Petronas dominance

 • But politically confirm that MA63 is hollow rhetoric

This fuels:

 • Sabah and Sarawak alignment

 • East Malaysian autonomy movements

 • Long-term legitimacy erosion

Option B: Lose the Case

They:

 • Fragment legal sovereignty

 • Set precedent for state regulatory supremacy

 • Lose control over oil & gas governance

Which is economically catastrophic for federal fiscal structure.

Either way, Malaya bleeds.

This is why this case is existential, not technical.

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6. Why This Is Bigger Than Petronas

If Sarawak wins on the AG point, the same doctrine applies to:

 • Land acquisition

 • Forestry

 • Carbon credits

 • Environmental regulation

 • Tax enforcement

 • Infrastructure licensing

Every future federal encroachment becomes challengeable as:

“Federal AG has no standing over state public interest.”

Federations are not weakened by autonomy. They are strengthened through constitutional judicial authority.

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Bottom Line (The Real One)

This case is not about gas.

It is about whether Malaysia is:

 • A unitary state pretending to be federal, or

 • A genuine federation where states possess real legal sovereignty

Sarawak is forcing the judiciary to answer that question.

And Malaya cannot escape it anymore.

This case may be cited repeatedly in future challenges where state autonomy and federal authority intersect.

BP Reports: https://www.theborneopost.com/2026/01/24/roles-of-federal-state-ags-under-spotlight-in-petronas-subsidiaries-hearing/

Thank you Sabah

Thank You, Sabah. Thank You, Sabahan.

You have spoken loudly and clearly in the Sabah state election (PRN17), and the message has shaken the entire nation.

To PMX Anwar Ibrahim, PKR, DAP, and Perikatan Nasional (PN) — take note. 

The people of Sabah have rejected you, and they rejected you decisively.

To PKR

You preached reform, anti-corruption, meritocracy, and multiculturalism for over 30 years. 

Yet when the moment came, Rafizi and the so-called reformists were sidelined to make way for Nurul Izzah — classic nepotism. PKR has turned into a “father-and-daughter” party.

Out of 12 seats contested, PKR won only ONE — and even that victory came from an imported candidate from another party.

To DAP

You lost ALL 8 seats you contested — every single traditional urban stronghold. In Luyang, Warisan crushed you with a 6,000-vote majority in a seat you once held by 18,000.

This is not just a defeat. This is the first tremor of a political earthquake coming for DAP in Sabah, and perhaps beyond.

You treated non-Malay voters like your fixed deposit, your personal insurance policy. 

When it mattered most, you went quiet, passive, and betrayed the community’s trust. You are turning into MCA 2.0.

Sarawak has recognised UEC. Hajiji has promised recognition if GRS returns to power. 

Yet at the federal level, DAP remains silent — acting deaf and dumb.

The loudest voices defending Chinese education and rights today are Abang Johari, Hajiji Noor, and Shafie Apdal — none of them Chinese. Think about that.

To Perikatan Nasional (PN)

You contested 41 seats and won only ONE.

Sabah, with more than 70% Muslim population, delivered a resounding rejection of your brand of radicalism, racism, and religious extremism. 

Even your own PAS candidate backtracked and dared not utter a word about banning alcohol, gambling, concerts, enforcing dress codes, or implementing hudud.

In Peninsular Malaysia, non-Muslims are your favourite punching bag — easy targets. 

In Sabah, you didn’t even dare try. 

Why? 

Because Sabah Muslims rejected your Semenanjung Taliban-style politics outright.

Sabahan Muslims are tolerant, respectful, progressive, and moderate. 

They do not weaponise race and religion the way PN does. 

That is the true face of Malaysian Islam — and Sabah showed it to the entire country.

Thank you, Sabah.

Thank you for proving that a Muslim-majority state can firmly reject extremist politics.

Thank you for reminding the nation what unity, maturity, and true Malaysian values look like.

The election is over. 

The old chapter of “Sabah for Sabahans” must now evolve into the next chapter: Borneo for Malaysia.

Sabah and Sarawak — you are the original natives of this land. 

You have preserved the soul of Malaysia when the peninsula lost its way. 

The political class in Semenanjung is rotten to the core. 

The only beacon of hope left is Borneo.

We Have Tried Everything from the Peninsula — And Everything Has Failed

We gave Barisan Nasional decades → corruption, kleptocracy, 1MDB.

We gave Pakatan Harapan the “Malaysia Baharu” dream → broken promises, nepotism , Sam Sterling , Surat Sokongan

We even gave Perikatan Nasional a chance → green-wave Extremism , Racism , Jana Wibawa , Menantu Lari and Economic Stagnation.

All three experiments from Peninsular Malaysia have failed miserably.

Two Different Malaysias — Two Different Futures

Peninsular Malaysia

Obsessed with moral policing, dress codes, khat, Jawi, signboard languages, halal/haram debates

Leaders who exploit race and religion to hide corruption

Victim mentality, tongkat culture, blaming others, dengki towards success

Creating imaginary enemies while the economy stagnates and talent flees

A regressive “cave mentality” even in the middle of KL

Sarawak & Sabah

Sarawak recognises UEC and pushes English + Mandarin as global languages

Merit-based scholarships, not race-based quotas

Leaders (Abang Johari, Hajiji, Shafie) talk about enlarging the economic pie for everyone

Focus on green energy, food security, education, sustainable investment

Looking forward, not backward

One side is stuck in the past.

The other side is building the future.

The Future of Malaysia Lies in the Hands of Sabah and Sarawak

You are the true guardians of unity, the last bastion of what it means to be truly Malaysian.

You are the original indigenous peoples of this land — your roots run deeper than anyone else’s. 

Long before others arrived, you were the stewards of this soil.

One day, may our Prime Minister come from Sabah or Sarawak.

If Sabah and Sarawak stand united, you are no longer just kingmakers — You can be the architects of Malaysia’s renaissance.

It is time for Borneo to rise, not just as participants in Malaysia’s story, but as its leaders.

One day, our Prime Minister must come from Sabah or Sarawak.

You have earned that right. 

You have preserved Malaysia’s soul when the peninsula lost its way.

The old chapter “Sabah for Sabahans, Sarawak for Sarawakians” is over.

The new chapter has begun: Borneo for Malaysia.

Seize this moment. Unite. Lead us.

Terima kasih, Sabah.

Thank you, Sarawak.

Thank you, Borneo.

You are our beacon of light.

You are our only hope.

Revisiting MA63 Constitution Amendment's

REVISITING MA63 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 

https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/186057/more-symbolic-than-substantial/

1. What the report actually establishes (not merely implies)

Although the article is framed as a discussion on the 2021 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, the professors’ observations go far beyond symbolism. Taken together, they establish three critical factual propositions:

(a) Sabah and Sarawak were constitutionally distinct in 1963

The respected professors reaffirm that in 1963 the Federation was structured into three separate constitutional categories:

    • the States of Malaya,

    • the Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak, and

    • Singapore.

This confirms that Sabah and Sarawak were never intended to be ordinary component states. Their status was asymmetrical, special, and autonomous, consistent with:

    • the IGC Report 1962,

    • MA63,

    • the Malaysia Act 1963, and

    • the original Federal Constitution as amended in September 1963.

The very need for repeated “restoration” amendments today is itself evidence that the original constitutional settlement has not survived.

(b) Systematic erosion of MA63 safeguards

The report lists a long chain of federal actions that cumulatively undermine MA63, including:

    • federalisation of key state powers (water, tourism, administration),

    • erosion of judicial autonomy in Borneo,

    • under-representation in Parliament and the civil service,

    • dilution of native law, religion, and immigration safeguards,

    • manipulation of state political processes,

    • imposition of federal religious and administrative norms,

    • demographic engineering through unlawful naturalisation.

These are not isolated policy disputes. They amount to persistent non-performance of MA63’s foundational terms.

Under general treaty law principles, such conduct constitutes:

    • material breach, and

    • repudiation by conduct.

(c) The 2021 amendment is an admission, not a cure

The professors are clear: the amendment is “more symbolic than substantial.”

Symbolic amendments cannot cure:

    • 60 years of non-compliance,

    • constitutional downgrading,

    • and structural domination inconsistent with the original bargain.

In legal terms, symbolism cannot revive a settlement that has already been fundamentally breached.

2. The decisive legal question raised by the report

Once these facts are accepted, the unavoidable question arises:

Was MA63 ever validly made—and if so, has it not been fundamentally breached and rendered void and non-binding?

The report, perhaps unintentionally, pushes the analysis directly into international law territory, where three fatal problems arise.

3. Validity: MA63 and the absence of genuine consent

From an SSRANZ perspective, the report reinforces that:

    • Sabah and Sarawak were colonies under British control, lacking full treaty-making capacity.

    • No referendum was held.

    • Consent was inferred through managed processes (Cobbold Commission, UN mission with limited terms).

    • Even at inception, Sabah and Sarawak’s status was ambiguous and contested.

The continued debate today—over “equal partner” status, MA63 guarantees, and constitutional position—demonstrates that there was never a true consensus ad idem in 1963.

In treaty terms, that alone places MA63’s validity in serious doubt.

4. Breach: MA63 as a broken constitutional bargain

Even assuming arguendo that MA63 was initially valid, the professors’ findings demonstrate:

    • sustained violation of core autonomy guarantees,

    • unilateral constitutional amendments by Malaya,

    • structural subordination of Sabah and Sarawak,

    • demographic and religious transformation contrary to MA63 assumptions.

Under customary international law (now reflected in the Vienna Convention principles), this amounts to fundamental breach, entitling the injured parties to treat the agreement as terminated.

5. The decolonisation frame: Malaysia as unfinished business

Crucially, the report implicitly confirms that decolonisation was never completed:

    • Sabah and Sarawak were not allowed to reassess their status once external threats ended.

    • Britain’s role was not neutral decolonisation but transfer of control under Pax Malaysia.

    • The federation evolved into a unitary-dominated state, contrary to the original arrangement.

This places Sabah and Sarawak squarely within the scope of:

    • UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), and

    • UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV).

Self-determination delayed is not self-determination denied.

6. SSRANZ conclusion: MA63, Malaysia, and final decolonisation

Read carefully, the professors’ report leads to a conclusion they stop short of stating:

    • MA63 has never operated as promised.

    • Its guarantees have been hollowed out beyond recognition.

    • Its symbolic “restorations” acknowledge failure rather than success.

    • The status of Sabah and Sarawak remains unresolved after more than six decades.

Accordingly, SSRANZ’s position is reaffirmed:

MA63 was void ab initio, among a host of reasons for invalidity; alternatively, it has been fundamentally breached, rendering it void and non-binding. Malaysia therefore lacks a settled legal and moral basis to assert permanent sovereignty over Sabah and Sarawak.

The logical and lawful remedy is not further symbolic amendment, but final decolonisation through a genuine, internationally consistent exercise of self-determination.

Anything less perpetuates the very constitutional and political contradictions that the professors themselves now acknowledge.

SSRANZ 22/12/25

https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/186057/more-symbolic-than-substantial/

Sarawak's rights Not to be Seized...

*Sarawak's Rights Not to be Seized, Not Negotiated, Premier Warns Federation* 

Borneo Herald

8.00AM MYT, 6-12-2025

KUCHING: The Sarawak government insists in the strongest possible terms that every inch of the seabed, subsoil and continental shelf within the state's borders is Sarawak's legitimate right. This right is not the result of current political demands, but a sovereign right guaranteed by law, enshrined in Malaysia's own formation documents.

Sarawak Premier, Tan Sri Abang Johari Tun Openg, reminded the Federation that there is no single clause in MA63 or the Malaysia Act 1963 that grants ownership of Sarawak's continental shelf to the Federal Government.

He stated firmly that any interpretation that attempts to deny Sarawak's rights is against the law, historically wrong, and constitutionally invalid.

"Sarawak's Rights Cannot Be Infringed. Period." Premier

“I repeat: Sarawak’s rights to the continental shelf are absolute, inalienable, and non-negotiable. The seabed and subsoil of this state have been Sarawak’s rights through the Land Code 1958 since Malaysia Day 1963. This is a legal fact, not an opinion,” the Premier stressed.

In his winding up speech at the State Legislative Assembly yesterday, he stressed that:

• Article 2 of the Federal Constitution protects Sarawak’s borders.

• The Federation cannot change the state’s borders without the consent of the State Legislative Assembly.

• Any attempt is considered a serious violation of the constitution.

Continental Shelf Act 2009: Black and White Evidence of Sarawak’s Rights

The amendment to the Continental Shelf Act 2009 confirms that the state has substantive rights to the seabed and subsoil within its borders. This law is aligned with MA63 and the Sarawak State Constitution, thus strengthening the legal position of Sarawak.

“Sarawak has been managing its oil and gas since the British era. This right existed long before the Federation took any role. No one has the right to challenge it in terms of law, they have no locus standi to do so,” explained the Premier.

Article 47(2) of the Sarawak State Constitution which is a legal annex to MA63 details the limits of state power, including the continental shelf.

Challenging Sarawak’s Rights = Violating MA63 + State Constitution + Federal Constitution

The Premier warned that anyone who tries to dispute Sarawak’s rights is directly violating:

1. MA63, the foundation of the formation of Malaysia,

2. Sarawak State Constitution, and

3. Federal Constitution.

He stressed that Sarawak has its own legal authority through:

• Petroleum Mining Ordinance 1958,

• Gas Distribution Ordinance 2016,

which gives Sarawak absolute power to control the exploration and extraction of natural resources within its territory.

“Therefore, every entity, whether GLC company, Federal agency or foreign company, must submit to Sarawak’s laws. State laws cannot be set aside, cannot be trampled upon.”

Sarawak Will Not Give Up – Laws in Side with the State

“Sarawak will not back down even an inch. The rights of this state are not just political demands; these rights are protected by the highest law of the land,” the Premier stressed.

The Premier closed with a stronger statement:

“The sovereignty of Sarawak’s land, resources and continental shelf is a historical right, a legal right and a constitutional right. These rights are not for negotiation, not for questioning, and not for grabs. Sarawak will defend them fully,” he said.

 *Additional* commentary by Dr Kanul Gindol, a veteran observer of State~Federal politics:

Sarawak presented the 2026 Budget of RM12.9 billion, the largest in its history, compared to a revenue of RM13.1 billion.

As a current comparison, the Sarawak Budget is twice as large as the Sabah Budget, and far behind the budgets of the Malayan states which are only around RM600 million (such as Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Perlis) to RM3 billion (Penang RM1 billion, Johor RM2 billion and Selangor RM3 billion).

This means that the 11 state governments in the Peninsula have been too dependent on the Federal Budget for their development. They are the ones who have always taken the rights of Sabah and Sarawak for over 60 years.

Dr Kanul Gindol

This has also resulted in Sabah and Sarawak continuing to lag behind in terms of development. However, Sarawak has managed to take initial steps to close this gap by increasing its revenue through several tax initiatives.

Sarawak is also expected to implement new tax initiatives regarding carbon emissions and pollution. They have enacted legislation on it following the efforts of the Federal Government in this regard.

Sarawak is expected to start collecting revenue from this initiative starting next year 2026.

Sabah has not yet enacted the same law, which means it will lag behind again. That is why Sabah needs a wise leader who is quick to enlist the help of intelligent officials, including the State Attorney.

*砂拉越的权利不可被夺取、不可谈判* —— *总理警告联邦政府* 

《婆罗洲先驱报》（Borneo Herald）

2025年12月6日 上午8时（马来西亚时间）

古晋讯：

砂拉越政府以最强烈措辞重申，凡位于砂拉越州界内的海床、底土及大陆架的每一寸土地，皆是砂拉越合法、正当的权利。这些权利并非源于当前的政治诉求，而是受法律保障、并明确写入马来西亚建国文件中的主权权利。

砂拉越总理丹斯里阿邦佐哈里·敦奥本提醒联邦政府，《1963年马来西亚协议》（MA63）及《1963年马来西亚法令》中，没有任何一项条文将砂拉越大陆架的所有权赋予联邦政府。

他严正指出，任何试图否认砂拉越权利的诠释，既违法、又违背历史事实，同时在宪法上也是无效的。

> “砂拉越的权利不可侵犯。没有讨论余地。”——总理

他强调：

> “我再次重申：砂拉越对大陆架的权利是绝对的、不可剥夺的、不可谈判的。自1963年马来西亚成立以来，砂拉越州内的海床与底土，已根据《1958年土地法典》确立为砂拉越的权利。这是法律事实，而不是个人意见。”

在昨日州议会总结发言中，总理进一步强调：

联邦宪法第2条保障砂拉越的州界；

未经州议会同意，联邦政府无权更改州界；

任何试图更改的行为，皆构成对宪法的严重侵犯。

《2009年大陆架法令》：砂拉越权利的白纸黑字证据

《2009年大陆架法令》的修订，确认砂拉越对州界内海床与底土拥有实质性权利。该法令与MA63及《砂拉越州宪法》相一致，进一步巩固了砂拉越的法律地位。

总理指出：

> “砂拉越自英殖民时期起，便已管理本州的石油与天然气资源。这项权利早于联邦政府的任何角色之前便已存在。任何人都无权在法律上挑战这一点，他们在法律上没有诉讼地位（locus standi）。”

作为MA63法律附件之一的《砂拉越州宪法》第47(2)条，明确列出州权力范围，包括大陆架。

挑战砂拉越权利 = 违反 MA63 + 州宪法 + 联邦宪法

总理警告，任何试图质疑砂拉越权利者，等同直接违反：

1. 《1963年马来西亚协议》（MA63），即马来西亚建国基础；

2. 《砂拉越州宪法》；

3. 《联邦宪法》。

他强调，砂拉越依法拥有自身的法律权力，包括：

《1958年石油采矿条例》；

《2016年天然气分配条例》。

上述法律赋予砂拉越对州内天然资源勘探与开采的完全控制权。

> “因此，任何实体——无论是官联公司、联邦机构或外国公司——都必须遵守砂拉越法律。州法律不能被搁置、不能被践踏。”

砂拉越绝不退让——法律站在砂拉越一方

 *总理重申：* 

> “砂拉越不会退让哪怕一寸。这些权利不仅是政治诉求，而是受到国家最高法律保障的权利。”

他以更强硬的声明作结：

> “砂拉越土地、资源与大陆架的主权，是历史权利、法律权利与宪法权利。这些权利不可谈判、不可质疑、不可被掠夺。砂拉越将全力捍卫。”

 *追加评论* 

资深州—联邦政治观察员 卡努尔·金多博士（Dr Kanul Gindol）

砂拉越于2026年提呈高达129亿令吉的财政预算案，为历来最高，对比州政府收入约131亿令吉。

作为对比，砂拉越的预算规模是沙巴的两倍，也远高于多个半岛州属，其州预算仅约：

6亿令吉左右（如马六甲、森美兰、玻璃市），

至30亿令吉（槟城约10亿、柔佛约20亿、雪兰莪约30亿）。

这显示半岛的11个州政府，长期高度依赖联邦拨款进行发展；过去60多年，正是这些州持续攫取了沙巴与砂拉越的权利。

卡努尔博士指出，这种结构性失衡，导致沙巴与砂拉越在发展上长期落后。不过，砂拉越已透过多项税务改革，开始缩小这一差距。

砂拉越也预计将就碳排放与污染推行新的税务措施，并已立法配合联邦在相关领域的努力，预计将于2026年起开始征税。

相较之下，沙巴尚未通过类似法案，意味着将再次落后。因此，沙巴迫切需要一位具远见的领导人，迅速集结包括州检察长在内的专业官员团队，以应对挑战。

The equal partner Myth

The Equal Partner Myth — And the Truth Malaysia Has Spent 60 Years Avoiding

https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/read/6412/not-just-equal-partners-but-protected/

For much of our post-Malaysia history, Sabahans and Sarawakians have been encouraged to accept a version of events that sits uneasily beside the documents and negotiations that shaped this federation. After 1963, we were not treated as equal partners at all; instead, Sabah and Sarawak were gradually downgraded and reclassified as if they were merely two of the states within Malaya’s existing structure. The historical reality of how Malaysia was built — and the constitutional protections promised to the Bornean territories — was pushed aside, while the public was told that our grievances were emotional rather than structural. Only in recent years, after decades of erosion, did the federal government amend the Constitution’s wording to once again acknowledge Sabah and Sarawak as “regions” and “partners,” attempting to restore in language what was long denied in practice. This new phrase, “equal partners,” has since gained political currency, becoming the rallying cry for recognition precisely because it offers dignity without confrontation. Yet its popularity reflects how far we have drifted from the truth: we cling to equality now because the original promise — protection — was taken from us.

The truth, when we finally choose to confront it fully, is fundamentally incompatible with this modern narrative. Sabah and Sarawak were never meant to be equal to Malaya’s states. They were not expected to surrender their distinct circumstances, nor were they intended to blend seamlessly into the framework of the existing Malayan federation. Malaysia, as negotiated between 1961 and 1963, was built on the recognition that Sabah and Sarawak were joining a political structure shaped by a much larger and more established partner. Equality would not have protected them. A carefully constructed imbalance was necessary. And that imbalance — entrenched in constitutional text and preserved in historical record — remains one of the most misunderstood truths of Malaysian nationhood.

How Malaysia Actually Began - A Union of Unequal Realities

When the Malaysia proposal was first raised, the Federation of Malaya was already a sovereign state with institutions, civil services, political parties, and a unified constitutional framework. Sabah and Sarawak, still under British rule, were in an entirely different position. They were diverse territories, administratively distinct, culturally rich, but politically young and vulnerable.

The British understood this. Malaya understood this. And the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak understood it most acutely, because they were being asked to join a federation whose political centre of gravity was firmly located in the Peninsula. This imbalance in size, power, and political maturity was so significant that the British insisted on the Cobbold Commission to test whether Malaysia could even be contemplated without jeopardising stability in North Borneo and Sarawak.

The Commission did not find blind enthusiasm; it found conditional acceptance. Yes, there was support — but it was support shaped by historical memory, caution, and fear of domination. Many worried openly that Malaysia might reproduce the patterns of colonial rule under a new name. The Commission acknowledged these anxieties fully. It concluded that Malaysia would only be acceptable if adequate safeguards were included to prevent Malaya from overshadowing the two territories. This was the first formal recognition that Sabah and Sarawak could not enter Malaysia on equal footing with Malaya’s states.

The IGC and the Hidden Architecture of Protection

The Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC), convened after the Cobbold Report, did not pretend that Sabah and Sarawak could be treated like Malayan states. Its members were explicit - the two Bornean territories required constitutional protections that reflected not only their cultural and religious differences, but also their political vulnerability. Malaya was a single federation with a unified political will. Sabah and Sarawak were separate territories negotiating their entry into that federation from a position of comparative weakness.

The IGC therefore designed a constitutional structure that was deliberately asymmetrical. It entrenched immigration control, protected the use of English, recognised native law and customs, vested land and resource authority in the states, provided for fiscal arrangements distinct from Malaya, and ensured a separate High Court for the Bornean territories. These were not symbolic concessions. They were safeguards carved into the federation because without them Malaysia would not have been viable.

The IGC’s work was not guided by the principle of equality. It was guided by the principle of protection.

The 20 Points - A Territory’s Attempt to Secure Its Future

Sabah’s 20-Point Agreement (and Sarawak’s 18-Point Agreement) made explicit what the IGC then translated into constitutional language. These documents were not declarations of parity with Malaya; they were statements of what the Bornean territories required in order to accept the federation. Their focus was not on status but on security — religious freedom, language rights, immigration control, education autonomy, native protections, and financial safeguards. They were written from the perspective of communities fully aware of how easily smaller territories can be submerged by larger ones.

The Points did not speak in the language of equals. They spoke in the language of survival.

The Constitutional Record - A Federation That Entrenched Asymmetry

The culmination of these negotiations was a constitutional structure that placed Sabah and Sarawak in a legally distinct category. Their autonomy was entrenched across multiple domains — land, resources, immigration, language, religion, native law, and judicial structure. Their financial arrangements differed from those in Malaya. Their court system operated under a separate High Court. Their guarantees were not intended to fade over time. They were intended to define the federation permanently.

But nowhere is this protective design clearer than in Article 161E.

Article 161E - The Constitutional Shield That Exposes the Equal Partner Myth

Article 161E places a special brake on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution in relation to Sabah and Sarawak. For a defined list of matters – including the citizenship position of those connected to the State before Malaysia Day, the constitution and jurisdiction of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak and the tenure of its judges, the distribution of legislative and executive powers and the financial arrangements that go with them, and the provisions on religion, language and the special treatment of natives – no amendment can take effect unless the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of the State concerned formally concurs. The amendments must still clear the usual constitutional threshold of a two-thirds majority in each House of Parliament, but they cannot proceed at all without the consent of the Head of State. Historically, even Sabah and Sarawak’s initial allocation of seats in Parliament was guarded in this way in the early years after Malaysia was formed. The result is not equality but something more demanding - a structure in which the constitutional position of Sabah and Sarawak cannot be altered by federal power acting alone.

This is the heart of the matter - the Constitution itself distinguishes Sabah and Sarawak from Malaya’s states. The framers did not entrust the future of these territories to federal goodwill. They entrenched a mechanism that recognised the risk of domination and sought to guard against it. If Malaysia had been built by equal partners, such a provision would have been unnecessary.

Its very existence makes the “equal partner” slogan crumble.

How Protection Was Lost — And How a Half-Truth Replaced It

Over the decades, political practice diverged from constitutional intention. Emergency powers, centralisation, and political compliance all contributed to the erosion of safeguards that were meant to be permanent. None of this happened because the Constitution failed. It happened because those entrusted to defend Sabah and Sarawak chose silence or convenience over principle. As federal dominance expanded, the original arrangement faded from public consciousness.

In this vacuum, the “equal partner” narrative grew. It was a polite way of asserting dignity without reopening uncomfortable historical truths. But it was also a half-truth — easier to say, less confrontational, and more acceptable to a political environment that resisted acknowledging the asymmetrical nature of Malaysia’s foundation.

Yet half-truths have consequences. They weaken the real argument. They concede too much before the debate even begins.

The Truth Malaysia Must Now Confront

If Malaysia is to honour the compact that created it, then we must speak plainly. Sabah and Sarawak were never intended to be equal to Malaya’s states. They were intended to be distinct — constitutionally, administratively, politically, and culturally. They were intended to be protected, not assimilated. Their autonomy was not a courtesy; it was a condition. Their safeguards were not ornamental; they were fundamental. Their consent was not optional; it was indispensable.

In constitutional terms, Sabah and Sarawak were never meant to be merely equal partners; they were meant to hold a position beyond equality, protected by safeguards that reflected their distinct circumstances and insulated them from the overwhelming weight of Malaya. This is the truth at the heart of the Malaysia that was negotiated, and it is a truth the country has spent sixty years avoiding.

The promise made in 1963 was not a promise of equality. It was a promise of protection — a promise written into the constitutional text, reflected in the IGC Report, demanded in the 20 Points, and justified by the realities the Cobbold Commission exposed. It is a promise Malaysia has avoided for decades, but a nation cannot outrun its own foundation forever.

Sabah and Sarawak were not equal partners. They were protected partners. And until Malaysia confronts this truth honestly and fully, the federation will continue to bear the weight of a bargain half-remembered and half-kept.

The time for half-truths is over. The record speaks for itself. The Constitution speaks for itself.

And the country must finally listen.

艾德娜挺身捍卫沙巴自主权

艾德娜·杰西卡·马金本挺身捍卫沙砂完整主权——何来“狭隘政治”？

（余清禄 11-12-2025）

     沙巴前亚庇县长、民兴党（Warisan）下南南区的沙巴立法州席候选人艾德娜·杰西卡·马金本（Edna Jessica Majimbun），11月21日在《婆罗洲先驱报》上严厉批评沙烈赛益克鲁亚克，把沙巴人民要求由本地政党组成政府称为“狭隘政治”，引起高度关注。艾德娜指出，这种论调不仅背离《1963年马来西亚协议》（MA63）的立国精神，更延续了数十年来“马来亚中心主义”主导沙砂命运的框架。她的发言之所以引起共鸣，是因为它切中沙巴与砂拉越人民长期感受到的压抑、失衡与被掏空的现实。【 注∶ 这位前沙巴亚庇县县长，29/11/202出征立法议会胜选，现在是现任下南南区的民兴党沙巴立法议员】

（一）、历史与法理：沙砂不是“州属”，而是“立国伙伴”

     当马来亚、沙巴、砂拉越与新加坡在1963年一同建立“马来西亚”时，其法律基础不是“加入马来亚”，而是依据《马来西亚协议》（MA63）、《婆罗洲邦建国报告》（IGC Report）与联合国决议所成立的邦联性质政治实体。

     因此，沙巴与砂拉越的地位在法理上应是与马来亚平行，而非从属。

关键法理包括：

（1）MA63 明确给予沙砂高度自治权与保障，包含：

财政自主（包括40%净税收返还）

土地与自然资源绝对管辖权

教育、移民、地方政府的州权

宗教自由与文化保护

（2）《联邦宪法》第112C、112D 明确保障沙巴的 40%净税收返还权。这不是“谈判”所得，而是宪法赋权。

（3）石油与天然气属于州资源，是沙砂原本的天然权利

     直到1974年的《石油发展法》（PDA74）强行把所有石油专属权交给国油（Petronas）。但许多法学者指出：

     PDA74 从未经过沙巴与砂拉越州议会批准，因此存有违宪争议。

     也就是说，沙砂人民捍卫自治，不仅非“狭隘”，更是恢复法定权利。

（二）、资源与财政被掏空的真实损失

     沙巴与砂拉越拥有马来西亚最多的天然资源，却长期是最贫穷的地区之一。这并非巧合，而是结构性财政掠夺所造成。

     （1）石油资源被抽走的巨大损失

     ① 以砂拉越为例：

砂拉越石油产量占马来西亚 约30%～40%

但根据PDA74，砂拉越仅能获得 5%石油开采税（royalty）

     ② 对比国际标准：

1. 加拿大油砂区返还率：约 35%～50%

2. 印度尼西亚：约 15%～25%

3. 挪威：超过 70%（含税与主权基金）

     若以过去 50年平均贡献约每年400亿令吉石油总值 来计算，砂拉越至少损失：每年超过100亿令吉、50年累计超过5000亿令吉的资源收入

     沙巴亦遭遇相似命运，被迫依赖联邦拨款，却牺牲发展能力。

     （2）沙巴40%净税收返还被拖欠超过半世纪

     根据联邦审计数据与经济分析，若沙巴自1974年以来能获得宪法保障的40%返还： 沙巴平均每年可获得 30～50亿令吉。50年累计应超过 1500～2000亿令吉

     但实情是： 这笔钱几乎从未按宪法和承诺返还。

     这才是沙巴贫穷的根本原因，而非人民“懒惰”，更不是地方政党能力不足。

     （3）基础建设被延宕，经济落后成为必然

     ① 沙巴与砂拉越至今仍缺乏全面高速公路

     ② 沙巴医疗、学校、道路与水供长期不足

     ③ 沙巴电力不稳定问题困扰工业发展

     ④ 人均收入长期低于全国平均约 40%

     这些不是地方政府不努力，而是被抽走的资源使地方发展严重受限。

（三）、政治干预造成的长期不稳定

     艾德娜指出的“联邦操控沙砂政治”并非夸大：

     ① 2020年“喜来登政变”波及沙巴，引发州政府更替

     ② 全国政党频繁安插政治代理人

     ③ 外来势力可在数日内改变州政府构成

     ④ 本地需求被忽略，政策以“马来亚视角”制定

     这不是“合作”，而是结构性干预。若沙砂连自身政权都无法自主决定，何来真正的邦联平等？

（四）、连柔佛都追求自治，沙砂人民更有理由坚持主体性

     柔佛王储 TMJ 公开表示：

『 柔佛应效仿砂拉越，不让外来政党主宰本州政治。』

     这是马来半岛最发达州属的声音。

     当连柔佛都认识到“地方主导地方政治”的价值时，沙巴与砂拉越作为国家创始伙伴，更应坚持自治。

（五）、完整自治不是分裂，而是回归建国原点

     沙砂人民追求的不是无缘无故脱离，而是：

① 恢复宪法赋予的权力

② 拥有固有资源主权

③ 自主规划发展

④ 结束半个世纪的结构性财政不公

⑤ 建立与联邦平等的邦联关系

     这正是 1963 年建国时所承诺的。

     最后，我所观察的结论是：沙砂完整自治，是建国承诺的必须回归

     将沙砂人民的正当诉求称为“狭隘政治”，不仅毫无依据，更是一种对历史与宪法的无视或无知。

     艾德娜的声音，不只是政治人物的观点，而是：沙巴与砂拉越人民几十年来被忽视、被掏空、被欺骗、被压制的共同心声。

     一个由沙巴人治理的沙巴、由砂拉越人治理的砂拉越，不是特权，而是 MA63 的核心原则。只有当沙砂真正拥有完整自主权，马来西亚才能回到邦联平等的原点，也才能实现真正的团结、正义与共同进步。

Sarawak alone contributed more than than Peninsula Malaysia

*Sarawak alone contributed more than Peninsular Malaysia*

*KUALA LUMPUR:* Malaysia generated RM775.2 billion in petroleum revenue between 2018 and 2024, according to Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Law and Institutional Reform), Datuk Seri Azalina Othman Said.

Citing data from Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas), she said the amount comprised RM284.8 billion from Peninsular Malaysia, RM205.0 billion from Sabah, and RM285.4 billion from Sarawak.

Over the same period, petroleum investments across Malaysia amounted to RM256 billion, comprising RM86.5 billion from Peninsular Malaysia, RM56.3 billion from Sabah, and RM113.2 billion from Sarawak.

"The overall investment-to-upstream revenue ratio stood at 33 per cent, with Peninsular Malaysia accounting for 30 per cent, Sabah 27 per cent, and Sarawak 40 per cent," she said in a written reply published on Parliament's website today.

She was responding to Mordi Bimol (PH-Mas Gading), who had asked for details on Petronas's annual exploration and production costs for oil and gas operations in each producing state from 2018 to 2024, and the percentage of those costs relative to total revenue. - Bernama