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Thailand's State-owned firm reform: for better or worse – Companies, Opinion, Politics
By Headline Editor
A
state-owned enterprise is somewhat an anomaly as it is neither public
nor private in nature. It is owned by everyone and yet no one.
It’s
raison d’etre is often the delivery of public services and yet most
operate commercially. How to deal with state-owned enterprises has been a
constant challenge facing many governments.
Thailand has had her
share of stateowned enterprises reform. In the year 2001, during the
then-Thaksin Shinawatra administration, the national oil and gas
company, the PTT, was corporatised then subsequently partially
privatised through the stock market.
The listing of the Airport
Authority of Thailand, which became the AoT Plc, and the Mass
Communication Organisation of Thailand, which became MCOT Plc, followed
in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
The privatisation scheme facilitated the mobilising of private capital that helped to expand these enterprises.
At
the same time, mandatory compliance to the more stringent stock market
rules governing disclosure, conflict of interests as well as internal
and external audits and controls helped boost transparency and
accountability within these organisations.
However, the reform left a bad taste in many Thai people’s mouths for several reasons.
First,
a large portion of the lucrative PTT’s share ended up in the hands of
several politicians and their relatives. Although these share
acquisitions may be legitimate, the resulting concentration of the much
coveted shares in the hands of the wealthier and financially privileged
few did not help.
Second, the failure to remove the monopolistic
business unit from the enterprise designated to be privatised (the gas
pipeline in case of the PTT) reveals the government’s narrow objective
of maximising revenue rather than the industry.
Third, and most
importantly, the partial privatisation that left the state the majority
equity shareholding did nothing to prevent the political meddling in
these enterprises. Corruption, scandals, fraud continued to plague these
listed state enterprises.
Since the mentioned privatisation bout,
there were only marginal reforms undertaken mainly by the bureaucrats
at the Ministry of Finance which supervises the state-enterprises.
For
example, in 2007 a roster of names of those who are qualified to sit on
state-enterprises’ board of directors was created in order to vet
candidates. This was known as the “director’s pool”. The scheme did not
work, however. Politicians in power could always add the names of those
they would like to appoint as directors on the roster.
When
the current government came into power, consolidation of the management
and control of the rather unruly state-owned enterprises was among the
issues on top of its agenda.
A committee
known as the “SOE superboard” consisting of the prime minister himself
as the chairman, the governor of the Bank of Thailand and a few
prominent bankers and financiers was created in 2014.
The
“superboard” recommended that a holding company that owns and manages
state enterprises, much like Temasek Holdings of Singapore or Khazanah
Nasional Berhad of Malaysia, should be established. And so for the past
three years, a draft law setting up such an entity has been in the
making.
The bill was approved by the cabinet in August this year
and in September, it passed the first reading of the National
Legislative Assembly (NLA). Proponents claim the law will help steer a
major reform in the management and governance of state enterprises.
Opponents,
on the other hand, accused the law of having a hidden agenda to
simplify the privatisation of state-owned enterprises whose shares are
held by the holding company and to centralise the control and management
of state-owned enterprises in the hands of politicians.
It’s
my belief that the law has been drafted with good intentions. It
contains many provisions that would help boost the transparency and
efficiency of stateowned enterprises. First, with establishment
of the holding company, the oversight of state-owned enterprises will
be clearly separated from the policy work. In the past, the State-owned
Enterprise Policy Committee was responsible for both policy and
supervision of SOEs.
Second, the consolidation of the supervision
and management of SOEs will facilitate better coordination among state
enterprises in terms of investment plans that will lead to better
allocation of financial resources. An illustrative example would be that
public buses and trains will now be better connected.
Third, the
law sets out clear procedures for the nomination and selection of state
enterprises and holding company directors with some provisions for
disclosure of the selection process to ensure this transparency.
Finally,
the bill contains transparent procedures governing the provision of
financial subsidies to state enterprises and a more rigorous regime to
hold the enterprises accountable for their performance. These are just a
few of the key reforms contained in the bill.
All this
seems to be very good for state enterprises and their management.
However, the Archilles’ heel of this bill is the selection and
appointment of directors of both the holding company and the individual
state enterprise.
Although the bill spelled out
clear procedures for vetting, nominating and selecting directors by
supposedly “independent committees”, these committees consist of former
bureaucrats like permanent secretaries of finance, governors of the
central bank and secretaries general of stock exchange commissions
handpicked by the stateowned enterprise policy committee made up of
various ministers, several high-ranking bureaucrats and chaired by the
prime minister.
Proponents of the bill posit there are
disclosure provisions that can ensure transparency of the nomination and
selection process. But the bill merely states that the committee
vetting candidates for directorship of individual state-owned
enterprises shall “disclose criteria and the selection procedure to the
public” [Section 37] but is silent on the transparency of the actual
selection process undertaken by line ministries.
The same goes for
the selection of board of directors of the holding company. Section
64(3) prescribes that the nominating committee shall “establish a
procedure that is transparent and open, keeping in mind about good
governance” and Section 64(4) stipulates the nomination criteria, method
and procedure to the public”. I believe these provisions are not
sufficient to ensure a merit-based selection process.
So
what can be done? In the absence of trust in politicians, it is
necessary to “depoliticise” the selection criteria. There are three
ways.
First, the law may spell out exactly the skill or
discipline of the director to be selected. This is a common practice in
many countries. For example, if you look up the list of directors on the
board of Singapore Airlines, you can see they are professionals in the
areas of finance, investment, marketing, law or engineering.
Second,
third parties may be appointed to the committee vetting candidates.
Examples of those with sufficient social capital include the governor of
the Bank of Thailand, the head of the Transparency International
(Thailand), the head of the Anti-Corruption Thailand (a private outfit),
or the head of the Thai Institute of Directors (IoD). These people can
set up subcommittees to oversee the task.
Third, the government
may invite third parties to observe the selection process from the very
beginning to the very end and report directly to the public.
At
the same time, the bill can go much further in setting a new governance
standard for state-owned enterprises. For example, it may stipulate that
stateowned enterprises’ investment projects above a certain size must
set aside a fund for third-party observation and audit. It may also
include a provision requiring all state-owned enterprises comply with
the same rules as listed companies do in terms of the disclosure
standard, the directors’ accountability, dealing with conflict of
interests, and so forth. If time is required for full compliance, then
provide for a definite phase-in period.
So will this latest
attempt at reform be better or worse for state enterprises? It will be
difficult to tell, as the whole scheme depends on who is in charge.
De-politicising the selection process and prescribing a concrete
governance standard in the law can help comfort Thais who are weary of
crooked politicians.
That said, there are no reasons to
reject the law. Thailand cannot afford to have state-owned enterprises
managed like a fiefdom as it has in the past. Let us help ensure the
reform delivers benefits to the people, not just to those in power.
Deunden Nikomborirak
Deunden
Nikomborirak, PhD, is research director for economic governance,
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). Policy analyses from the
TDRI appear in the Bangkok Post on alternate Wednesdays.
First Published:
Wednesday, November 22, 2017 on Bangkok Post: Policy focus
The post State-owned firm reform: for better or worse appeared first on
TDRI: Thailand Development Research Institute.