Reject Malayan parties

Suggest giving points on why we need to reject the Malayan parties:

*WHY REJECT MALAYAN PARTIES FROM CONTESTING IN SABAH & SARAWAK*

*Malayan parties contesting here is not democracy — it’s subtle takeover.* 

 *1. Protect the MA63 compact’s seat-allocation safeguard*

* The MA63 negotiations implicitly envisaged protections against Malayan dominance by granting Sabah & Sarawak dedicated representation.

* Allowing Malayan parties to contest undermines that protective design — it dilutes the seat-allocation intent and opens the door to overwhelming by Malayan votes.

* If that seat-allocation right is still legally alive, then Malayan parties have no right to invade those slots.

*2. Prevent federal takeover of internal affairs & resources*

* If Malayan parties win seats locally, they gain leverage to influence or usurp local policy, budget, resource management and appointments.

* This paves the path for centralisation and creeping control from Kuala Lumpur into what ought to be local jurisdiction.

* In effect, we surrender political autonomy and resource sovereignty.

*3. Safeguard local identity and priorities*

* Sabah and Sarawak have distinct ethnic, cultural, geographic and economic conditions. Local parties are more responsive to local needs.

* Malayan parties often impose Peninsular agendas not suited to Borneo’s realities.

* We must not allow outside parties to drive our direction, especially when they lack deep local accountability.

*4. Maintain checks on constitutional imbalance*

* With Malayan parties contesting and winning seats, they can support federal amendments or laws inimical to MA63 or state rights.

* Even if Sabah & Sarawak had “reserved seats,” Malayan party MPs allied to the center can swell the majority, override protections, or push centralising amendments.

    

*5. Uphold the decolonisation/self-determination rationale*

* The anti-cession struggle and MA63 were ostensibly about ensuring self-rule, not integration into Malaya’s party system.

* If external parties contest us, we revert to a neo-colonial political pattern — where control is exercised via party machines, not local consent.

*6. Violates spirit (and possibly letter) of MA63 and constitutional protection*

* Many activists argue that certain provisions of MA63 entrench state autonomy and limit federal encroachment. Malayan parties intruding is arguably contrary to that entrenchment. 

* Under SSRANZ proposals, expelling the Malayan parties is seen as necessary to defend the MA63 guaranteed (if valid) seat allocation right. (See SSRANZ public statements) (e-pbk.com)

* PBK and other groups have publicly argued that Malayan parties contesting amounts to “poaching” of seats allocated to Sabah & Sarawak. (e-pbk.com)

 *7. Political leverage: Local parties must have priority*

* Rejecting Malayan parties forces constituents to choose local representatives who are more accountable to local interests.

* It strengthens state-based political parties, fosters local leadership, and reduces dependence on KL’s patronage networks.

*8. Defensive move in the face of historical domination*

* Historically, Malayan parties have dominated policy direction, resource extraction, and federal priorities at the expense of Sabah & Sarawak.

* Allowing them further in local contests perpetuates historical injustice and structural imbalance.

*9. Electoral fairness and sovereignty of state elections*

* State-level elections should remain under the jurisdiction of the local people, not be a satellite of national party contests.

* Malayan parties entering local fields distort the playing field — they bring in national funding, networks and influence not available locally.

https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/267690/pbk-urges-sabah-sarawak-voters-to-reject-malayan-parties/

All this is a continuation of the Ningkan Crisis from 1966

*All this is a continuation of the Ningkan Crisis from 1966.* 

The current struggle over Sarawak’s sovereignty cannot be separated from the Ningkan Crisis of 1966, when Sarawak’s first Chief Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, was unlawfully removed under federal pressure. That episode marked the start of direct Malayan intervention in Sarawak politics. GPS’ political predecessors participated in this ouster, inheriting—rather than resolving—the deeper problem of Malayanisation. Today, those unresolved issues resurface in the fight over Sarawak’s territorial rights.

At the heart of Sarawak’s position is the argument that federal laws seizing control of land and natural resources—the Continental Shelf Act 1966 (CSA), the Petroleum Development Act 1974 (PDA), and later the Territorial Sea Act 2012 (TSA)—were never validly consented to by Sarawak’s Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN). This violates both the Federal Constitution and the terms of MA63, which required local legislative approval for changes to fundamental rights and territorial arrangements.

This, in turn, reopens the foundational question of Malaysia’s legality. If the formation of Malaysia lacked genuine and informed consent of the people of Sarawak (as required under international law, UNGA Resolutions 1514 & 1541, and reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Chagos case), then the federation’s legal basis is gravely weakened. Malaysia’s claim to be a decolonisation exercise collapses if it is shown to be merely a transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Malaya under a void treaty.

*International law is clear*: in the context of decolonisation, boundaries cannot be redrawn and territories cannot be seized without the free and genuine consent of the people concerned. This principle is also embedded in Malaysia’s own Federal Constitution, Article 3, which recognises the sanctity of territorial integrity in decolonisation.

*The legislative manoeuvres in 2012, where the TSA was rushed through to reassert federal control once emergency powers lapsed, reveal that federal authorities were always conscious of the illegality of their claims. Far from being inadvertent, this was a deliberate policy of consolidation over Sarawak’s land and offshore wealth.*

*Conclusion*

The cumulative effect of the Ningkan ouster, the unilateral federal legislation (CSA 1966, PDA 1974, TSA 2012), and the absence of genuine consent at Malaysia’s formation amounts to a fundamental breach of MA63—if it were ever valid in the first place. These breaches extinguish Malaysia’s legal claim over Sarawak’s sovereignty.

Sarawak, therefore, possesses not only the political but also the legal right to reclaim independence through final decolonisation. The path forward is not the piecemeal restoration of powers under MA63, but the assertion of Sarawak’s right to self-determination under international law, free from Malayan encroachment.

See CT Choo & Chang's well-researched paper, FEDERALISM AND RESTORATION OF SARAWAK’S TERRITORIAL WATERS AND BOUNDARIES.