The mystery of Sabah's state religion

The Mystery of Sabah’s State Religion: A Wake Up Call for Sarawak

📜 The Original Promise: No State Religion

In 1963, Point 1 of the 20 Point Agreement clearly stated: “There should be no state religion in Sabah.” This was a key condition for Sabah joining Malaysia to protect religious freedom and prevent religion from being politicized.

🔧 Silent Constitutional Change: No Referendum, No Coverage

Yet by 1973, Sabah’s constitution was quietly amended to make Islam the official state religion, without any referendum, public debate, or significant media coverage. Sabah lost its secular status in silence.

🤝 Who Benefited? Who Betrayed Sabah?

The masterminds were Sabahan parties aligned with West Malaysian UMNO, who traded Sabah’s secular constitution for political power and funding. Some say this was the start of a cultural conquest.

🧪 Sabah Was the Testbed Sarawak Is the Target

Conspiracy theorists argue: Sabah was just the testing ground; the real prize is Sarawak, where religious freedom is stronger. Today, similar patterns are emerging in Sarawak:

 • Public buildings adopting mosque-like architecture

 • Official events beginning with Islamic prayers

 • Education system increasingly reflecting West Malaysian norms

 • Non-Muslims gradually excluded from core decision-making

Sarawak is retracing Sabah’s steps only decades later.

A Rebuttal to the validity of MA63

https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/read/6209/ma63-fatigue-scepticism-and-cynicism/

A Rebuttal to the Naiveté on MA63: 

*THE LEGAL FICTION AND THE DENIAL OF SELF-DETERMINATION*

*A REBUTTAL TO THE ROMANTICISED MA63 NARRATIVE: DECONSTRUCTING THE "PARTNERSHIP" MYTH*

The perspective that laments "MA63 fatigue" while clinging to a romanticised view of the Agreement's origins—that it was a "negotiated arrangement premised on mutual respect" between "equal partners"—fails to engage with the overwhelming historical and legal record. This view, as expressed by commentators like Roger Chin, is not just optimistic; it is fundamentally ahistorical, flawed and ignores the deliberate colonial machinations that engineered Malaysia's formation.

The article's lament about "MA63 fatigue" is undercut by its own uncritical adoption of the very idealised language that causes this disillusionment. Phrases like “A Partnership That Was Meant to Be Equal” and “The Malaysia Agreement was intended to reflect that foundational understanding—that these were equal partners, not appendages” are not historical facts; they are a political narrative designed to cover up a deeply flawed and coercive process.

A critical examination of the historical record reveals this "partnership" to be a legal fiction, forced upon the people of Sabah and Sarawak without their sovereign consent.

*1. The Fiction of Negotiation and the Reality of Colonial Imposition*

The central pillar of this romanticised narrative of a "carefully negotiated" arrangement between equal partners collapses under the simplest scrutiny: *who, exactly, negotiated and signed the agreement?* 

The undeniable historical fact is that no elected representatives of North Borneo or Sarawak were involved in the core discussions with the British and Malayan governments from 1958 onwards. The negotiations were conducted by British colonial officials. The signatories for the Borneo territories were not leaders with a popular mandate but the colonial Attorney-Generals, W.K.H. Jones (North Borneo) and P.E.H. Pike (Sarawak), acting alongside British-appointed nominees.

*2. An Agreement Void from the Beginning (Void Ab Initio)*

On July 9, 1963, Sarawak and North Borneo were British Crown Colonies, not sovereign states. Under international law (as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and British constitutional law (the Statute of Westminster 1931), colonies lack the legal capacity to enter into treaties. 

This was not a mystery; internal British communications, including from Attorney-General Pike himself, reveal they were acutely aware of this fatal legal flaw. Pike explicitly advised that including the colonies as signatories was invalid but should be done for “presentational purposes.” This admission transforms MA63 from a treaty into a deliberate misrepresentation—a document designed to create the illusion of partnership to legitimise a colonial handover.

*3. The Brutal Denial of Self-Determination*

This process constituted a blatant violation of the inalienable right to self-determination under UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541, which guaranteed non-self-governing territories a free and fair vote on their political future. 

The people of Sabah and Sarawak were systematically denied a referendum. Instead, the process was rushed under a climate of fear following the armed Brunei Uprising in December 1962, which was met with emergency laws, mass arrests, and detention without trial. This was not negotiation; it was annexation under duress.

*Conclusion: Fatigue from Gaslighting, Not Broken Promises*

Therefore, the profound "fatigue, scepticism and cynicism" is profoundly misunderstood by the article. It is not simply a modern ailment born of promises being broken today. It is the exhaustion that comes from six decades of being told a fairy tale—of a "carefully negotiated" "equal partnership"—that the foundational evidence categorically disproves.

The fatigue is a rational response to a sustained gaslighting campaign that uses flowery language like “equal partners, not appendages” to whitewash a historical reality where the people were never treated as partners, but as colonial assets to be transferred. The scepticism is not cynicism; it is the justified intellectual position of those who have chosen to examine the evidence over repeating the myth.

Abdullah Badawi gave away Sarawk oil blocks to Brunei

Badawi Is Dead But Never Forget He Gave Away Sarawak's Oil Blocks To Brunei WIthout Sarawak's Permission

Malaysia’s Costly Concession: The 2009 Brunei Deal and the Loss of Sarawak’s Oil Wealth

In March 2009, Malaysia, under then-Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, signed a secretive agreement with Brunei that critics argue ranks among the nation’s most egregious diplomatic blunders. The Exchange of Letters, as it’s euphemistically called, resolved a decades-long territorial dispute over Limbang and offshore oil blocks in the South China Sea—but at what cost? According to detractors, Malaysia handed Brunei sovereignty over two immensely valuable oil blocks, known as L and M (now Brunei’s CA1 and CA2), in a deal so lopsided it’s tantamount to giving away Sarawak’s economic future for a pittance. Assuming the worst-case scenario, the numbers are staggering, and the fallout continues to haunt Malaysia’s credibility and prosperity.

The Deal: A Faustian Bargain

The 2009 agreement was sold as a diplomatic triumph, ostensibly securing Limbang—a Sarawak district Brunei historically claimed—while granting Malaysia a 40-year commercial stake in the disputed oil blocks. But critics, led by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, cried foul, accusing Badawi of surrendering Malaysia’s sovereign rights over blocks L and M, which they claim held reserves worth hundreds of billions. The lack of transparency fueled suspicion: the letters’ details were never fully disclosed, and the public learned of the deal’s scope only when Murphy Oil, a U.S. firm with contracts for the blocks, announced their termination in 2010, stating the areas were “no longer part of Malaysia.”

Why the secrecy? Critics argue Badawi’s administration knew the deal was indefensible. By ceding sovereignty, Malaysia relinquished control over resources that could have transformed Sarawak and the nation. The joint development arrangement with Petronas, Malaysia’s state oil firm, was a weak consolation—Brunei now calls the shots, and Malaysia’s share is a fraction of what full ownership would have yielded. Limbang, a small district with limited economic potential, was hardly worth the trade. Some even question whether Brunei explicitly dropped its claim, as Brunei’s Foreign Minister later suggested Limbang wasn’t discussed, casting doubt on Malaysia’s supposed gains.

The Staggering Value Lost

Let’s assume the worst, as critics have long feared: blocks L and M were a treasure trove of oil and gas, and Malaysia’s concession was a catastrophic miscalculation. In 2010, analysts speculated block L alone could produce 150,000–200,000 barrels per day (bpd), potentially doubling Brunei’s output at the time. Combined with block M, estimates suggested reserves of 500 million to 1 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), possibly more, given nearby fields like Kikeh, which boasted 400–700 million barrels. Fast-forward to 2025, with Brent crude hovering at $80–$90 per barrel, the gross value of 1 billion BOE could exceed $80–90 billion. Gas, a significant component, adds further billions at $5–$7 per million Btu.

Since 2009, Brunei has quietly developed these blocks with partners like Total and Shell. Assuming production began around 2013–2015 and ramped up to 50,000–100,000 bpd by 2025 (a conservative worst-case estimate), the blocks may have already yielded 200–400 million BOE. At $80 per barrel, that’s $16–$32 billion in gross revenue—revenue Malaysia could have claimed outright. Instead, Petronas scrambles for a minority share, perhaps 20–30%, leaving Malaysia with crumbs: maybe $3–$9 billion over a decade, minus hefty costs and taxes. Over the 40-year agreement, critics warn, Malaysia’s total take might not exceed $20–$30 billion, while Brunei reaps $50–$100 billion or more. Mahathir’s claim of a RM320 billion (USD100 billion) loss, once dismissed as hyperbole, looks chillingly plausible in this light.

Production: Brunei’s Gain, Malaysia’s Pain

Brunei’s reticence about CA1 and CA2’s output only deepens suspicions. Unlike Malaysia, which publishes Petronas reports, Brunei releases vague national figures. In 2022, Brunei’s oil and gas exports were $2.1 billion, with CA1 and CA2 likely contributing significantly since exploration resumed post-2009. If each block produces 25,000–50,000 bpd (a reasonable worst-case guess), that’s 18–36 million barrels annually combined. Over 10 years, 180–360 million barrels at $80 yields $14–$29 billion already pocketed by Brunei and its partners. Malaysia’s cut, filtered through Petronas’ diluted stake, might be $2–$8 billion—peanuts compared to full ownership.

Gas adds insult to injury. CA1’s Maharaja Lela field, for instance, is rumored to be gas-heavy, feeding Brunei’s LNG exports (90 cargoes daily). If CA1/CA2 supply 20–30% of Brunei’s gas, that’s billions more in revenue Malaysia could have tapped. Instead, Petronas plays second fiddle, its profits siphoned off by Brunei’s sovereignty and foreign operators like Total. Critics argue this is a slow bleed: every barrel and cubic foot extracted enriches Brunei while Malaysia watches from the sidelines, locked into a deal that prioritizes diplomacy over dollars.

Why It Hurts: Sarawak’s Betrayal

For Sarawakians, the deal stings deepest. Blocks L and M lie off their coast, yet Sarawak sees little benefit. Malaysia’s federal structure funnels oil revenue to Putrajaya and Petronas, not the state. Had Malaysia retained sovereignty, Sarawak could have pushed for a bigger share, boosting local development. Instead, the 2009 deal feels like a double betrayal: Kuala Lumpur gave away Sarawak’s wealth, and Sarawakians got no say. Critics point to Badawi’s haste—signed weeks before his resignation—as evidence of political expediency, perhaps to burnish his legacy or placate Brunei at Malaysia’s expense.

The Limbang argument falls flat. Valued at $1–$2 billion in land and resources, it’s a drop in the bucket compared to the blocks’ potential. Even if Brunei’s claim was weak (historical records suggest it was), Malaysia could have negotiated harder or pursued arbitration, as it did successfully against Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan in 2002. Instead, Badawi’s team folded, leaving critics to speculate about incompetence—or worse, hidden motives. Was pressure from foreign oil firms or geopolitical players a factor? The secrecy invites such questions, unanswered to this day.

A Legacy of Regret

Assuming the worst, the 2009 deal is a wound that festers. Brunei, a tiny sultanate, gained a windfall that could sustain its economy for decades, while Malaysia forfeited a resource base that could have funded schools, hospitals, and infrastructure. Petronas’ commercial stake is a bandage on a gaping hole—Malaysia trades sovereignty for scraps, reliant on Brunei’s goodwill and foreign operators’ terms. By 2049, when the 40-year deal expires, the blocks may be depleted, leaving Malaysia with nothing but regret.

Critics like Mahathir were right to sound the alarm: the deal was a giveaway, cloaked in diplomatic platitudes. The lack of public debate, the rushed timing, and the murky terms scream mismanagement. Sarawakians, especially, deserve answers—why was their birthright bartered so cheaply? As Brunei drills and prospers, Malaysia counts the cost of a decision that, in the worst light, traded a fortune for fleeting goodwill. The numbers don’t lie: up to $100 billion lost, and counting. For a nation that prides itself on sovereignty, this was a surrender history won’t forgive.