WHY WAS IT REALLY SAYING?
The 1962 letter by Sir William Goode, then Governor of British North Borneo, provides a revealing snapshot of British colonial thinking in the lead-up to the Malaysia project. While he expresses concern about North Borneo’s unreadiness and the potential dangers of rushing Malaysia, his argument is ultimately shaped by a deeply colonial and strategic calculus—not a principled commitment to self-determination. Below is a critical analysis of his position, highlighting key flaws and contradictions:
🔍 1. Lip Service to Self-Determination, But No Real Commitment
Goode acknowledges that the Malaysia proposal came as a shock to the people of North Borneo and that they were focused on domestic development with “no wish for change.” This is a clear admission that the people had neither expressed desire for Malaysia nor participated in its conception. Yet despite this, Goode treats Malaysia’s formation as inevitable, implying that the real issue is timing, not consent.
🔴 Flaw: Goode sidesteps the legal obligation under UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV) Principle IX, which requires a genuine act of self-determination—not just “preparation” for absorption into another country.
🔍 2. “Delay to Prepare” as a Colonial Smokescreen
He calls for a delay of several years to build institutions and political leadership before implementing Malaysia. This appears reasonable on the surface. However, his version of “preparation” is highly manipulative: it is not about enabling free political development or alternatives like independence, but rather about shaping local leadership to conform to pre-agreed Malaysia terms.
🔴 Flaw: This exposes the British strategy of manufacturing consent—deliberately building a class of elites who would eventually “agree” to Malaysia, while foreclosing meaningful alternatives, such as independence or UN-supervised referendum.
🔍 3. Admits Communism Was Not a Real Threat in North Borneo
Goode admits that Communists had no real foothold in North Borneo due to the absence of class struggle, trade unions, or anti-colonial movements. Yet later, he still parrots the anti-Communist rationale for Malaysia as necessary to counter Communist threats—particularly in Singapore.
🔴 Flaw: This contradiction undermines the entire security rationale for Malaysia. If North Borneo was politically dormant and not threatened by Communism, then its inclusion in Malaysia to counter Communism in Singapore was wholly unjustified.
🔍 4. Confession That Malaysia Was Driven by Singapore’s Political Crisis
He openly admits that the urgent push for Malaysia was due to internal political problems in Singapore, especially fears that Lee Kuan Yew’s government might fall to the Communist-linked Barisan Sosialis. Goode explains that the Tunku needed Borneo's inclusion as a “cover” to push merger with Singapore past domestic Malay resistance.
🔴 Flaw: This is a damning admission. It confirms that North Borneo (and Sarawak) were used as geopolitical pawns to resolve a Malayan and British dilemma over Singapore. It also violates the principle of equal partnership, as the Borneo territories were merely tools to enable a pre-planned outcome.
🔍 5. Manipulative View of Political Development
Goode is explicit that North Borneo's political leaders should not be given powers they would not retain under Malaysia. He proposes a controlled political transition, tightly circumscribed within a federal structure already drafted in advance.
🔴 Flaw: This reveals a profoundly anti-democratic mindset. Political development was not to be organic or representative, but rather engineered to ensure alignment with the federal blueprint—a blueprint never subjected to popular vote or referendum in North Borneo.
🔍 6. Complete Absence of Legal Basis for Federation
Goode makes no reference to any binding international legal framework (e.g., UN-supervised referendum, plebiscite, or treaty ratified by a self-governing people). The entire conversation is framed in administrative and strategic terms, not legal or human rights terms.
🔴 Flaw: His silence on UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and international norms for decolonisation shows that British colonial authorities were acting in breach of international law—effectively engineering a disguised transfer of colonial authority from London to Kuala Lumpur.
🔍 7. Brunei’s Opposition as a Red Flag
He notes that Azahari had mobilised Bruneian public opinion against Malaysia, and that the Sultan was hesitant to proceed. The Brunei Revolt (December 1962) occurred just months after this letter, showing that Goode vastly underestimated the depth of opposition to Malaysia in Borneo.
🔴 Flaw: This weakens the claim that there was widespread support for Malaysia, and highlights that British assessments were flawed, dismissive, or politically biased. Brunei’s rejection of Malaysia also invalidates claims of a unified regional desire for federation.
🔍 8. No Reference to the Manila Accord (1963)
The letter pre-dates the Manila Accord (July 1963), but it reveals that British policy was already moving ahead without safeguards for self-determination. When the Manila Accord later called for the “free and voluntary expression of the will of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak,” it was reactive, not proactive—a diplomatic cover for an already illegitimate process.
🔴 Flaw: The failure to build in genuine mechanisms for consent—such as a referendum—before negotiating federation terms, is a core violation of international treaty law and decolonisation norms.
✅ Conclusion
Sir William Goode’s letter is important not for what it argues, but for what it reveals:
• That Malaysia was not a popular demand, but a British–Malayan geopolitical construct to stabilise Singapore and contain Communism.
• That self-determination was never truly on the table for North Borneo.
• That the process was guided by colonial manipulation, not democratic consent.
His call for a “transition period” masks a deeper strategy: to prepare the territory not for freedom, but for controlled absorption. Goode’s letter is, ultimately, an early exposé of the illegitimacy of the Malaysia formation process—and provides powerful evidence for legal and moral claims for Sabah and Sarawak’s right to self-determination today.
