The mystery of Sabah's state religion

The Mystery of Sabah’s State Religion: A Wake Up Call for Sarawak

📜 The Original Promise: No State Religion

In 1963, Point 1 of the 20 Point Agreement clearly stated: “There should be no state religion in Sabah.” This was a key condition for Sabah joining Malaysia to protect religious freedom and prevent religion from being politicized.

🔧 Silent Constitutional Change: No Referendum, No Coverage

Yet by 1973, Sabah’s constitution was quietly amended to make Islam the official state religion, without any referendum, public debate, or significant media coverage. Sabah lost its secular status in silence.

🤝 Who Benefited? Who Betrayed Sabah?

The masterminds were Sabahan parties aligned with West Malaysian UMNO, who traded Sabah’s secular constitution for political power and funding. Some say this was the start of a cultural conquest.

🧪 Sabah Was the Testbed Sarawak Is the Target

Conspiracy theorists argue: Sabah was just the testing ground; the real prize is Sarawak, where religious freedom is stronger. Today, similar patterns are emerging in Sarawak:

 • Public buildings adopting mosque-like architecture

 • Official events beginning with Islamic prayers

 • Education system increasingly reflecting West Malaysian norms

 • Non-Muslims gradually excluded from core decision-making

Sarawak is retracing Sabah’s steps only decades later.

A Rebuttal to the validity of MA63

https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/read/6209/ma63-fatigue-scepticism-and-cynicism/

A Rebuttal to the Naiveté on MA63: 

*THE LEGAL FICTION AND THE DENIAL OF SELF-DETERMINATION*

*A REBUTTAL TO THE ROMANTICISED MA63 NARRATIVE: DECONSTRUCTING THE "PARTNERSHIP" MYTH*

The perspective that laments "MA63 fatigue" while clinging to a romanticised view of the Agreement's origins—that it was a "negotiated arrangement premised on mutual respect" between "equal partners"—fails to engage with the overwhelming historical and legal record. This view, as expressed by commentators like Roger Chin, is not just optimistic; it is fundamentally ahistorical, flawed and ignores the deliberate colonial machinations that engineered Malaysia's formation.

The article's lament about "MA63 fatigue" is undercut by its own uncritical adoption of the very idealised language that causes this disillusionment. Phrases like “A Partnership That Was Meant to Be Equal” and “The Malaysia Agreement was intended to reflect that foundational understanding—that these were equal partners, not appendages” are not historical facts; they are a political narrative designed to cover up a deeply flawed and coercive process.

A critical examination of the historical record reveals this "partnership" to be a legal fiction, forced upon the people of Sabah and Sarawak without their sovereign consent.

*1. The Fiction of Negotiation and the Reality of Colonial Imposition*

The central pillar of this romanticised narrative of a "carefully negotiated" arrangement between equal partners collapses under the simplest scrutiny: *who, exactly, negotiated and signed the agreement?* 

The undeniable historical fact is that no elected representatives of North Borneo or Sarawak were involved in the core discussions with the British and Malayan governments from 1958 onwards. The negotiations were conducted by British colonial officials. The signatories for the Borneo territories were not leaders with a popular mandate but the colonial Attorney-Generals, W.K.H. Jones (North Borneo) and P.E.H. Pike (Sarawak), acting alongside British-appointed nominees.

*2. An Agreement Void from the Beginning (Void Ab Initio)*

On July 9, 1963, Sarawak and North Borneo were British Crown Colonies, not sovereign states. Under international law (as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and British constitutional law (the Statute of Westminster 1931), colonies lack the legal capacity to enter into treaties. 

This was not a mystery; internal British communications, including from Attorney-General Pike himself, reveal they were acutely aware of this fatal legal flaw. Pike explicitly advised that including the colonies as signatories was invalid but should be done for “presentational purposes.” This admission transforms MA63 from a treaty into a deliberate misrepresentation—a document designed to create the illusion of partnership to legitimise a colonial handover.

*3. The Brutal Denial of Self-Determination*

This process constituted a blatant violation of the inalienable right to self-determination under UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541, which guaranteed non-self-governing territories a free and fair vote on their political future. 

The people of Sabah and Sarawak were systematically denied a referendum. Instead, the process was rushed under a climate of fear following the armed Brunei Uprising in December 1962, which was met with emergency laws, mass arrests, and detention without trial. This was not negotiation; it was annexation under duress.

*Conclusion: Fatigue from Gaslighting, Not Broken Promises*

Therefore, the profound "fatigue, scepticism and cynicism" is profoundly misunderstood by the article. It is not simply a modern ailment born of promises being broken today. It is the exhaustion that comes from six decades of being told a fairy tale—of a "carefully negotiated" "equal partnership"—that the foundational evidence categorically disproves.

The fatigue is a rational response to a sustained gaslighting campaign that uses flowery language like “equal partners, not appendages” to whitewash a historical reality where the people were never treated as partners, but as colonial assets to be transferred. The scepticism is not cynicism; it is the justified intellectual position of those who have chosen to examine the evidence over repeating the myth.

Abdullah Badawi gave away Sarawk oil blocks to Brunei

Badawi Is Dead But Never Forget He Gave Away Sarawak's Oil Blocks To Brunei WIthout Sarawak's Permission

Malaysia’s Costly Concession: The 2009 Brunei Deal and the Loss of Sarawak’s Oil Wealth

In March 2009, Malaysia, under then-Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, signed a secretive agreement with Brunei that critics argue ranks among the nation’s most egregious diplomatic blunders. The Exchange of Letters, as it’s euphemistically called, resolved a decades-long territorial dispute over Limbang and offshore oil blocks in the South China Sea—but at what cost? According to detractors, Malaysia handed Brunei sovereignty over two immensely valuable oil blocks, known as L and M (now Brunei’s CA1 and CA2), in a deal so lopsided it’s tantamount to giving away Sarawak’s economic future for a pittance. Assuming the worst-case scenario, the numbers are staggering, and the fallout continues to haunt Malaysia’s credibility and prosperity.

The Deal: A Faustian Bargain

The 2009 agreement was sold as a diplomatic triumph, ostensibly securing Limbang—a Sarawak district Brunei historically claimed—while granting Malaysia a 40-year commercial stake in the disputed oil blocks. But critics, led by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, cried foul, accusing Badawi of surrendering Malaysia’s sovereign rights over blocks L and M, which they claim held reserves worth hundreds of billions. The lack of transparency fueled suspicion: the letters’ details were never fully disclosed, and the public learned of the deal’s scope only when Murphy Oil, a U.S. firm with contracts for the blocks, announced their termination in 2010, stating the areas were “no longer part of Malaysia.”

Why the secrecy? Critics argue Badawi’s administration knew the deal was indefensible. By ceding sovereignty, Malaysia relinquished control over resources that could have transformed Sarawak and the nation. The joint development arrangement with Petronas, Malaysia’s state oil firm, was a weak consolation—Brunei now calls the shots, and Malaysia’s share is a fraction of what full ownership would have yielded. Limbang, a small district with limited economic potential, was hardly worth the trade. Some even question whether Brunei explicitly dropped its claim, as Brunei’s Foreign Minister later suggested Limbang wasn’t discussed, casting doubt on Malaysia’s supposed gains.

The Staggering Value Lost

Let’s assume the worst, as critics have long feared: blocks L and M were a treasure trove of oil and gas, and Malaysia’s concession was a catastrophic miscalculation. In 2010, analysts speculated block L alone could produce 150,000–200,000 barrels per day (bpd), potentially doubling Brunei’s output at the time. Combined with block M, estimates suggested reserves of 500 million to 1 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), possibly more, given nearby fields like Kikeh, which boasted 400–700 million barrels. Fast-forward to 2025, with Brent crude hovering at $80–$90 per barrel, the gross value of 1 billion BOE could exceed $80–90 billion. Gas, a significant component, adds further billions at $5–$7 per million Btu.

Since 2009, Brunei has quietly developed these blocks with partners like Total and Shell. Assuming production began around 2013–2015 and ramped up to 50,000–100,000 bpd by 2025 (a conservative worst-case estimate), the blocks may have already yielded 200–400 million BOE. At $80 per barrel, that’s $16–$32 billion in gross revenue—revenue Malaysia could have claimed outright. Instead, Petronas scrambles for a minority share, perhaps 20–30%, leaving Malaysia with crumbs: maybe $3–$9 billion over a decade, minus hefty costs and taxes. Over the 40-year agreement, critics warn, Malaysia’s total take might not exceed $20–$30 billion, while Brunei reaps $50–$100 billion or more. Mahathir’s claim of a RM320 billion (USD100 billion) loss, once dismissed as hyperbole, looks chillingly plausible in this light.

Production: Brunei’s Gain, Malaysia’s Pain

Brunei’s reticence about CA1 and CA2’s output only deepens suspicions. Unlike Malaysia, which publishes Petronas reports, Brunei releases vague national figures. In 2022, Brunei’s oil and gas exports were $2.1 billion, with CA1 and CA2 likely contributing significantly since exploration resumed post-2009. If each block produces 25,000–50,000 bpd (a reasonable worst-case guess), that’s 18–36 million barrels annually combined. Over 10 years, 180–360 million barrels at $80 yields $14–$29 billion already pocketed by Brunei and its partners. Malaysia’s cut, filtered through Petronas’ diluted stake, might be $2–$8 billion—peanuts compared to full ownership.

Gas adds insult to injury. CA1’s Maharaja Lela field, for instance, is rumored to be gas-heavy, feeding Brunei’s LNG exports (90 cargoes daily). If CA1/CA2 supply 20–30% of Brunei’s gas, that’s billions more in revenue Malaysia could have tapped. Instead, Petronas plays second fiddle, its profits siphoned off by Brunei’s sovereignty and foreign operators like Total. Critics argue this is a slow bleed: every barrel and cubic foot extracted enriches Brunei while Malaysia watches from the sidelines, locked into a deal that prioritizes diplomacy over dollars.

Why It Hurts: Sarawak’s Betrayal

For Sarawakians, the deal stings deepest. Blocks L and M lie off their coast, yet Sarawak sees little benefit. Malaysia’s federal structure funnels oil revenue to Putrajaya and Petronas, not the state. Had Malaysia retained sovereignty, Sarawak could have pushed for a bigger share, boosting local development. Instead, the 2009 deal feels like a double betrayal: Kuala Lumpur gave away Sarawak’s wealth, and Sarawakians got no say. Critics point to Badawi’s haste—signed weeks before his resignation—as evidence of political expediency, perhaps to burnish his legacy or placate Brunei at Malaysia’s expense.

The Limbang argument falls flat. Valued at $1–$2 billion in land and resources, it’s a drop in the bucket compared to the blocks’ potential. Even if Brunei’s claim was weak (historical records suggest it was), Malaysia could have negotiated harder or pursued arbitration, as it did successfully against Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan in 2002. Instead, Badawi’s team folded, leaving critics to speculate about incompetence—or worse, hidden motives. Was pressure from foreign oil firms or geopolitical players a factor? The secrecy invites such questions, unanswered to this day.

A Legacy of Regret

Assuming the worst, the 2009 deal is a wound that festers. Brunei, a tiny sultanate, gained a windfall that could sustain its economy for decades, while Malaysia forfeited a resource base that could have funded schools, hospitals, and infrastructure. Petronas’ commercial stake is a bandage on a gaping hole—Malaysia trades sovereignty for scraps, reliant on Brunei’s goodwill and foreign operators’ terms. By 2049, when the 40-year deal expires, the blocks may be depleted, leaving Malaysia with nothing but regret.

Critics like Mahathir were right to sound the alarm: the deal was a giveaway, cloaked in diplomatic platitudes. The lack of public debate, the rushed timing, and the murky terms scream mismanagement. Sarawakians, especially, deserve answers—why was their birthright bartered so cheaply? As Brunei drills and prospers, Malaysia counts the cost of a decision that, in the worst light, traded a fortune for fleeting goodwill. The numbers don’t lie: up to $100 billion lost, and counting. For a nation that prides itself on sovereignty, this was a surrender history won’t forgive.

William Goode 1962 Letter on Malaysia

WILLIAM GOODE’S 1962 LETTER ON MALAYSIA

WHY WAS IT REALLY SAYING?

The 1962 letter by Sir William Goode, then Governor of British North Borneo, provides a revealing snapshot of British colonial thinking in the lead-up to the Malaysia project. While he expresses concern about North Borneo’s unreadiness and the potential dangers of rushing Malaysia, his argument is ultimately shaped by a deeply colonial and strategic calculus—not a principled commitment to self-determination. Below is a critical analysis of his position, highlighting key flaws and contradictions:

🔍 1. Lip Service to Self-Determination, But No Real Commitment

Goode acknowledges that the Malaysia proposal came as a shock to the people of North Borneo and that they were focused on domestic development with “no wish for change.” This is a clear admission that the people had neither expressed desire for Malaysia nor participated in its conception. Yet despite this, Goode treats Malaysia’s formation as inevitable, implying that the real issue is timing, not consent.

🔴 Flaw: Goode sidesteps the legal obligation under UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV) Principle IX, which requires a genuine act of self-determination—not just “preparation” for absorption into another country.

🔍 2. “Delay to Prepare” as a Colonial Smokescreen

He calls for a delay of several years to build institutions and political leadership before implementing Malaysia. This appears reasonable on the surface. However, his version of “preparation” is highly manipulative: it is not about enabling free political development or alternatives like independence, but rather about shaping local leadership to conform to pre-agreed Malaysia terms.

🔴 Flaw: This exposes the British strategy of manufacturing consent—deliberately building a class of elites who would eventually “agree” to Malaysia, while foreclosing meaningful alternatives, such as independence or UN-supervised referendum.

🔍 3. Admits Communism Was Not a Real Threat in North Borneo

Goode admits that Communists had no real foothold in North Borneo due to the absence of class struggle, trade unions, or anti-colonial movements. Yet later, he still parrots the anti-Communist rationale for Malaysia as necessary to counter Communist threats—particularly in Singapore.

🔴 Flaw: This contradiction undermines the entire security rationale for Malaysia. If North Borneo was politically dormant and not threatened by Communism, then its inclusion in Malaysia to counter Communism in Singapore was wholly unjustified.

🔍 4. Confession That Malaysia Was Driven by Singapore’s Political Crisis

He openly admits that the urgent push for Malaysia was due to internal political problems in Singapore, especially fears that Lee Kuan Yew’s government might fall to the Communist-linked Barisan Sosialis. Goode explains that the Tunku needed Borneo's inclusion as a “cover” to push merger with Singapore past domestic Malay resistance.

🔴 Flaw: This is a damning admission. It confirms that North Borneo (and Sarawak) were used as geopolitical pawns to resolve a Malayan and British dilemma over Singapore. It also violates the principle of equal partnership, as the Borneo territories were merely tools to enable a pre-planned outcome.

🔍 5. Manipulative View of Political Development

Goode is explicit that North Borneo's political leaders should not be given powers they would not retain under Malaysia. He proposes a controlled political transition, tightly circumscribed within a federal structure already drafted in advance.

🔴 Flaw: This reveals a profoundly anti-democratic mindset. Political development was not to be organic or representative, but rather engineered to ensure alignment with the federal blueprint—a blueprint never subjected to popular vote or referendum in North Borneo.

🔍 6. Complete Absence of Legal Basis for Federation

Goode makes no reference to any binding international legal framework (e.g., UN-supervised referendum, plebiscite, or treaty ratified by a self-governing people). The entire conversation is framed in administrative and strategic terms, not legal or human rights terms.

🔴 Flaw: His silence on UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and international norms for decolonisation shows that British colonial authorities were acting in breach of international law—effectively engineering a disguised transfer of colonial authority from London to Kuala Lumpur.

🔍 7. Brunei’s Opposition as a Red Flag

He notes that Azahari had mobilised Bruneian public opinion against Malaysia, and that the Sultan was hesitant to proceed. The Brunei Revolt (December 1962) occurred just months after this letter, showing that Goode vastly underestimated the depth of opposition to Malaysia in Borneo.

🔴 Flaw: This weakens the claim that there was widespread support for Malaysia, and highlights that British assessments were flawed, dismissive, or politically biased. Brunei’s rejection of Malaysia also invalidates claims of a unified regional desire for federation.

🔍 8. No Reference to the Manila Accord (1963)

The letter pre-dates the Manila Accord (July 1963), but it reveals that British policy was already moving ahead without safeguards for self-determination. When the Manila Accord later called for the “free and voluntary expression of the will of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak,” it was reactive, not proactive—a diplomatic cover for an already illegitimate process.

🔴 Flaw: The failure to build in genuine mechanisms for consent—such as a referendum—before negotiating federation terms, is a core violation of international treaty law and decolonisation norms.

✅ Conclusion

Sir William Goode’s letter is important not for what it argues, but for what it reveals:

    • That Malaysia was not a popular demand, but a British–Malayan geopolitical construct to stabilise Singapore and contain Communism.

    • That self-determination was never truly on the table for North Borneo.

    • That the process was guided by colonial manipulation, not democratic consent.

His call for a “transition period” masks a deeper strategy: to prepare the territory not for freedom, but for controlled absorption. Goode’s letter is, ultimately, an early exposé of the illegitimacy of the Malaysia formation process—and provides powerful evidence for legal and moral claims for Sabah and Sarawak’s right to self-determination today.

砂拉越有权独立吗？

各位砂拉越的同胞们，大家好。

SLM：脱马无罪 独立有理

砂拉越有权力独立吗？有或没有

大家知道马来西亚联邦是由砂拉越，沙巴，新加坡和马来亚签署一份国际协议叫马来西亚协议/MA63。 马来亚是一个独立国家然而砂拉越，沙巴和新加坡是还没独立的国家。 因此这砂拉越，沙巴和新加坡根本没有法定资格签署国际协议。 （1） 

在1965年，新加坡退出而独立去了。 （2）

马来西亚就是马来亚的更名。MA63协议延迟到1970年才在联合国登记这是违反联合国宪法。（3）

砂沙参组马联邦60多年，可是马来亚以马联邦的名义不间断的掠夺，剥削，打压，镇压，抢劫，霸凌和殖民咱们。

他们完全不按照MA63条约执行对砂沙任务。所以，今天，咱们看到的实相是马半岛不断的进步和繁荣，但是他们的进步和繁荣是建立在砂沙的贫穷上。 就这一重点已经足够让这协议无效。（4）

更不用说他们把MA63修改了600多次。这是国际协议，哪里可以由马来亚为主的政府如此任意修改。这是另一个因素让这协议无效。（5）

MA63完全是英国政府以马来亚为中心的策划根本就违法联合国在1960年12月14日大会通过【去殖民化宣言】1514号决议的自决权和1541号决议的集体决定权的国际法。

完全不给砂沙人民公投下，把这两家殖民地强硬的加入马来亚来扩展该国的土地，完全违反联合国【去殖民化宣言】的宪章。 （6）

在MA63条款中，没有限定砂沙退出马联邦。因此，砂沙人民有1514和1541或1441决定权退出。 （7）

Does Sarawak have the right to be independent? Yes or No

As we all know that the Malaysia Agreement/MA63 is an international agreement signed by Sarawak, Sabah, Singapore (SSS) and Malaya when Malaya was an independent country whereas SSS were not yet independent to have the locus standi to sign the treaty. (1)

In 1965, when Singapore withdrew, it also rendered MA63 void. （2）

MA63 was only registered with the United Nations in 1970 and thus they violated the United Nations Constitution. (3)

For over 60 years in the Malaysia Federation (Malaya in disguise), Sarawak and Sabah have continuously been plundered, exploited, oppressed, suppressed, robbed, bullied and colonised.

The Federal government did not act in accordance with the MA63 treaty at all. Thus, we only see the progress and prosperity of Malaya at the expense of the poverty of Sarawak and Sabah, which is enough to invalidate the agreement. (4)

The modification of MA63 over 600 times by the Malayan-dominated government is another factor rendering this agreement invalid. (5)

MA63 is a Malaya-centred plan by the British government and fundamentally violates the international law of the right to self-determination 1514 and the right to collective determination 1541 of the [Declaration of Decolonisation] adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14/12/1960.

Without giving Sabahans and Sarawakians a referendum, the two colonies were forcefully added to Malaya to expand its territory as against the Charter of Declaration of Decolonization of the United Nations (6)

In the terms of MA63, there is no restriction on Sabah and Sarawak withdrawing from the Malaysia Federation. Therefore, Sabahans and Sarawakians have the 1514 and 1541 or 1441 decision to withdraw. (7)

Adakah Sarawak mempunyai hak untuk merdeka? Ya atau tidak

Seperti yang kita sedia maklum bahawa Perjanjian Malaysia/MA63 adalah perjanjian antarabangsa yang ditandatangani oleh Sarawak, Sabah, Singapura (SSS) dan Malaya semasa Malaya adalah sebuah negara merdeka sedangkan SSS belum lagi merdeka untuk mempunyai locus standi untuk menandatangani perjanjian tersebut. (1)

Pada tahun 1965, apabila Singapura menarik diri, ia juga menjadikan MA63 tidak sah. （2）

MA63 hanya didaftarkan dengan UN sehingga 1970 dan dengan itu mereka melanggar Perlembagaan UN. (3)

Selama lebih 60 tahun dalam Malaysia (Malaya berselindung), Sarawak sentiasa dirompak, dieksploitasi, ditindas, dirompak, dibuli dan dijajah.

Kerajaan Federal sama sekali tidak bertindak mengikut perjanjian MA63. Justeru secara realitinya, kita hanya melihat kemajuan dan kemakmuran Malaya dengan mengorbankan kemiskinan Sarawak dan Sabah, yang sudah cukup untuk membatalkan perjanjian itu. (4)

Pengubahsuaian MA63 lebih 600 kali oleh kerajaan yang dikuasai Malaya merupakan satu lagi faktor yang menyebabkan perjanjian ini tidak sah. (5)

MA63 ialah rancangan berpusatkan Malaya oleh kerajaan British dan secara asasnya melanggar undang-undang antarabangsa hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri 1514 dan hak untuk penentuan kolektif dalam Resolusi 1541 [Deklarasi Dekolonisasi] yang diterima pakai oleh UN pada 14/12/1960.

Tanpa memberikan rakyat Sabah dan Sarawak referendum, kedua-dua jajahan itu telah ditambah secara paksa ke Tanah Melayu untuk meluaskan wilayahnya bertentangan dengan Piagam Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu/UN [Deklarasi Dekolonisasi]. (6)

Dalam terma MA63, tiada sekatan ke atas Sabah dan Sarawak menarik diri daripada Persekutuan Malaysia. Oleh itu, rakyat Sabah dan Sarawak mempunyai keputusan 1514 dan 1541 atau 1441 untuk menarik diri. (7)

康菲石油退出

康菲石油退出深水油气田项目 罗克强：转变并不是失败

2025年5月1日

https://news.seehua.com/post/1315299

（古晋1日讯）康菲石油（ConocoPhillips）公司最近宣布退出萨拉姆帕塔瓦利(Salam-Patawali)深水油气田项目的消息引发了担忧﹐但有关担忧忽视了一个更重要的事实﹐即是次转变并不是失败﹐而是砂拉越朝着自主掌控经济未来迈出的关键且必要的一步。

砂峇都吉当区立法议员罗克强是以文告方式﹐如是表示。

他说明﹐康菲石油公司最近宣布退出萨拉姆帕塔瓦利深水油气田项目的消息﹐引发了一些人对于投资者信心的质疑﹐特别是在砂拉越透过砂拉越石油公司不断扩大其在油气领域的影响力之际。

“然而﹐是种担忧忽视了一个更重要的事实﹐即是次转变并不是失败﹐而是砂拉越朝着自主掌控经济未来迈出的关键且必要的一步。”

他透露﹐当中需要明确了解的是﹐萨拉姆帕塔瓦利深水油气田项目仍处于可行性评估阶段﹐而那也正是康菲石油公司当前能够退出其与国家石油公司的合作的原因。

“但那并不意味着﹐砂拉越的未来投资之门已经关闭。康菲石油公司将来仍有可能回归﹐而届时﹐应是在代表砂拉越利益的砂石油公司参与下﹐并且是在对砂拉越更为公平的条款基础上进行合作。”

他还建议说﹐一个更公平的合作模式﹐或许可以是砂拉越与康菲石油公司之间的50:50合资企业。

“即便是类似安排﹐砂拉越仍可能象征性地拨出5%份额予联邦政府﹐以作为联邦政府过去50年来‘慷慨’给予砂拉越5%油气收入的一种回馈。毕竟﹐相关油气资源并

非出自马来亚半岛的土地与海域﹐而是来自砂拉越自身的领土﹐所以砂拉越愿意让出5%份额﹐已是格外宽厚。”

他称﹐以圭亚那(Guyana)与埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)之间的50:50合资模式为例的话﹐则圭亚那无需在前期投入资金﹐便能透过利润油和特许权使用费获得丰厚回报﹐且随着成本逐步回收﹐其分成比例还会进一步增加。

“砂拉越理应享有不低于类似合作模式的权益。”

他提及﹐在过去50多年里﹐砂拉越在1974年石油发展法令下﹐仅获得5%的石油与天然气现金收益。

“值得注意的是﹐该法令是在紧急状态期间颁布﹐且从未获得砂拉越立法机构﹐即砂立法议会的正式通过。实际上﹐在砂拉越的立法议会记录当中﹐也完全找不到任何有关该法令被审议或通过的记录。”

他遗憾看见﹐尽管砂拉越为国家财政贡献了数以亿计的收入﹐但在基础设施建设与整体发展方面﹐砂拉越却长期处于落后状态。

“联邦政府拨款一直严重不足﹐尤其是与砂拉越幅员辽阔的地理条件﹐以及复杂的交通物流需求相比下﹐更显得分配极不合理。在过去半个世纪﹐我们奉献了高达95%的石油与天然气资源﹐却换来微不足道的回报。”

与此同时﹐他说明﹐针对1974年石油发展法令之合法性的法律挑战﹐目前仍在进行当中。但在等待法庭裁决前需要强调的是﹐砂拉越拥有早在1958年就已颁布1958年石油开采法令。

“该法令早在1974年石油发展法令通过前存在﹐也是砂拉越主张拥有本土资源监管权的重要法律依据。”

他表示﹐无论法院最终如何裁定﹐有一点毋庸置疑的是﹐砂拉越理应在自身天然资源的管理与收益分配中﹐发挥更重要﹑更主导的角色。

“倘若国油公司能够与国际企业组建合资公司并共同运营油田﹐那砂石油公司一旦具备同样开展类似合作的正当性与潜力的话也同样可以﹐而当中的关键就在于加强自身的能力建设﹐以及战略合作伙伴关系的开展。”

他续称﹐在许多现有的合资项目中﹐即便国油公司拥有50%股权﹐但实际的运营工作往往仍由蚬标公司或康菲石油公司等国际公司负责执行。

“既然技术执行主要由外国合作方负责﹐那砂石油公司作为砂拉越的代表﹐就完全有能力直接与他们接洽与谈判﹐又何须再由国油公司代为出面？毕竟﹐国油公司并不是技术成功的必要条件。”

他指出﹐油气行业仍是全球最具利润与竞争力的领域之一﹐所以即便康菲石油公司选择退出﹐其他的企业也势必会接踵而至﹐特别是在砂拉越展现出开放﹑透明﹑公平且互利的投资环境之下。

“那不是一种对抗﹐而是一场转型。它立足于公平﹑宪政合法性﹐以及砂拉越人民欲根据1963年马来西亚立国契约所拥有的合理权利﹐即自主掌控自身资源。”

他还强调﹐在经历了马来亚数十年的边缘化对待之后﹐当前正是砂拉越重拾其对本土陆地与海域资源主权的关键时刻。

“正因如此﹐砂拉越总理拿督巴丁宜阿邦佐哈里呼吁人民无视外界的讥讽与质疑﹐而那不仅合理﹐更是必要的。在他的带领下﹐砂政党联盟政府正稳步推进一系列理性﹑具前瞻性且诚信的战略方针﹐以切实符合砂拉越的长远发展利益。”

他直言﹐任由外界冷嘲热讽﹐砂拉越都将坚定前行。

“我们正勇敢而果断地﹐迈向一个由自己主宰命运的未来。”

An Open Letter to Premier Abang Jo

*An Open Letter to Premier Abang Zohari and the Sarawak GPS Government: A Betrayal of Trust, A Failure of Leadership*  

Dear Premier Abang Zohari Openg and the Sarawak GPS State Government,  

Trust you are keeping well and safe.

We, the people of Sarawak, write to you not with malice, but with profound disappointment and anger. 

For decades, Sarawakians have been fed promises of *"restoring, defending, and protecting Sarawak’s rights"* under the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). 

Yet, the recent capitulation to Putrajaya over the Petroleum Development Act 1974 (PDA74) and the ownership of Sarawak’s oil and gas resources reveals a truth we can no longer ignore: *your words ring hollow, and your actions betray Sarawak*.  

*Broken Promises, Broken Trust*  

You pledged to continue the legacy of the late Chief Minister Adenan Satem (“Tok Nan”), who declared that *"Sarawak’s relationship with the Federal Government must be “constitutionally correct.”* 

Tok Nan’s defiance against federal overreach inspired hope that Sarawak would finally reclaim what is rightfully ours under MA63: *autonomy over our resources*.  

Yet, today, we witness the opposite. 

By conceding to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s assertion that PDA74 remains unchallenged and “business as usual,” you have surrendered Sarawak’s constitutional leverage. 

Law Minister Azalina Othman’s revelation—that Sarawak *“acknowledged and recognized”* PDA74 during closed-door talks—confirms this betrayal. 

How can you reconcile this with your own legal advisors’ stance that PDA74 was enacted *“in secrecy,”* *“unconstitutionally,”* and in violation of MA63?  

*The Petros Mirage: A Symbol of Surrender* 

The creation of Petros was hailed as a breakthrough, a vehicle for Sarawak to reclaim control of its oil and gas. 

Instead, it has become a fig leaf, masking Sarawak’s subservience to Petronas. 

*PM Anwar’s statement—that Petros is merely a “gas aggregator” (excluding LNG, Sarawak’s most lucrative resource)—exposes the grim reality: Sarawak remains a spectator rather than a gladiator in its own house*.  

*You claim PDA74 and the Sarawak Oil Mining Ordinance 1958 (OMO58) can “co-exist,” but this legal ambiguity serves only Petronas and Kuala Lumpur.*

*By refusing to pursue a definitive judicial resolution or parliamentary repeal of PDA74, you have chosen political convenience over constitutional justice*.  

*NATO Leadership: No Action, Talk Only*  

Your partners/colleagues' defense—that opposition figures like Chong Chieng Jen “did nothing”—is a red herring. 

Sarawakians entrusted *you* with an overwhelming mandate. GPS dominates the state assembly and holds pivotal federal influence. Yet, when leverage mattered most, you folded.  

Worse, you dismissed critics as “politicizing the issue,” while offering no substantive rebuttal to Azalina’s damning admission. 

If PDA74 is unconstitutional, why not challenge it in court? 

If MA63 guarantees our resource rights, why concede ownership to Petronas? 

*Silence is complicity.*  

*A Legacy of Failure*  

Tok Nan warned: *“Do not underestimate the people’s intelligence.”* 

Sarawakians are not fools. We see through the theatrics. 

The late Chief Minister fought to delist Sarawak as a “state” in federal documents, asserting our equal partnership. Today, you have reduced Sarawak to a supplicant, begging for crumbs from Petronas’ table.  

Your predecessors traded Sarawak’s resources for “thirty pieces of silver.” You, however, have done worse: *legitimizing theft by validating PDA74*. This is not leadership—it is submission.  

*Our Demands: Action, Not Apologies* 

Sarawakians do not seek hollow slogans or blame games. We demand:  

1. *Immediate legal action* to challenge PDA74’s constitutionality in court, as your own legal advisors insist it violates MA63.  

2. *Parliamentary motion* to repeal or amend PDA74, leveraging GPS’s influence in the unity government.  

3. *Transparency* in all negotiations with Putrajaya—no more secret deals that sell out Sarawak.  

Premier Abang Zohari, you once vowed that GPS would *“fight to the death”* for Sarawak’s rights. Today, your words are ashes. If you will not act, please graciously step aside for leaders who will.  

*Sarawak’s oil and gas belong to Sarawakians. This is non-negotiable.* 

*We will not forget the betrayals of Fairland Sarawak*  

 

*Fairland Sarawak*  

*On behalf of Sarawakians Who Believe in Justice as 'an equal founding partner in the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia'.*

*If not now, when ?*

*If not us Sarawakians, who else ?*

*WE ❤️ SARAWAK !!!*

*Jaga Sarawak bait-bait*

*Anak-Anak Sarawak*

*LAK-SA63*

*21/2/2025*

*Note: This letter is a collective expression of frustration from Sarawakians who expected their leaders to prioritize the state’s constitutional rights over political expediency.* 

*The fight for MA63 is not partisan—it is existential.*