William Goode 1962 Letter on Malaysia

WILLIAM GOODE’S 1962 LETTER ON MALAYSIA

WHY WAS IT REALLY SAYING?

The 1962 letter by Sir William Goode, then Governor of British North Borneo, provides a revealing snapshot of British colonial thinking in the lead-up to the Malaysia project. While he expresses concern about North Borneo’s unreadiness and the potential dangers of rushing Malaysia, his argument is ultimately shaped by a deeply colonial and strategic calculus—not a principled commitment to self-determination. Below is a critical analysis of his position, highlighting key flaws and contradictions:

🔍 1. Lip Service to Self-Determination, But No Real Commitment

Goode acknowledges that the Malaysia proposal came as a shock to the people of North Borneo and that they were focused on domestic development with “no wish for change.” This is a clear admission that the people had neither expressed desire for Malaysia nor participated in its conception. Yet despite this, Goode treats Malaysia’s formation as inevitable, implying that the real issue is timing, not consent.

🔴 Flaw: Goode sidesteps the legal obligation under UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV) Principle IX, which requires a genuine act of self-determination—not just “preparation” for absorption into another country.

🔍 2. “Delay to Prepare” as a Colonial Smokescreen

He calls for a delay of several years to build institutions and political leadership before implementing Malaysia. This appears reasonable on the surface. However, his version of “preparation” is highly manipulative: it is not about enabling free political development or alternatives like independence, but rather about shaping local leadership to conform to pre-agreed Malaysia terms.

🔴 Flaw: This exposes the British strategy of manufacturing consent—deliberately building a class of elites who would eventually “agree” to Malaysia, while foreclosing meaningful alternatives, such as independence or UN-supervised referendum.

🔍 3. Admits Communism Was Not a Real Threat in North Borneo

Goode admits that Communists had no real foothold in North Borneo due to the absence of class struggle, trade unions, or anti-colonial movements. Yet later, he still parrots the anti-Communist rationale for Malaysia as necessary to counter Communist threats—particularly in Singapore.

🔴 Flaw: This contradiction undermines the entire security rationale for Malaysia. If North Borneo was politically dormant and not threatened by Communism, then its inclusion in Malaysia to counter Communism in Singapore was wholly unjustified.

🔍 4. Confession That Malaysia Was Driven by Singapore’s Political Crisis

He openly admits that the urgent push for Malaysia was due to internal political problems in Singapore, especially fears that Lee Kuan Yew’s government might fall to the Communist-linked Barisan Sosialis. Goode explains that the Tunku needed Borneo's inclusion as a “cover” to push merger with Singapore past domestic Malay resistance.

🔴 Flaw: This is a damning admission. It confirms that North Borneo (and Sarawak) were used as geopolitical pawns to resolve a Malayan and British dilemma over Singapore. It also violates the principle of equal partnership, as the Borneo territories were merely tools to enable a pre-planned outcome.

🔍 5. Manipulative View of Political Development

Goode is explicit that North Borneo's political leaders should not be given powers they would not retain under Malaysia. He proposes a controlled political transition, tightly circumscribed within a federal structure already drafted in advance.

🔴 Flaw: This reveals a profoundly anti-democratic mindset. Political development was not to be organic or representative, but rather engineered to ensure alignment with the federal blueprint—a blueprint never subjected to popular vote or referendum in North Borneo.

🔍 6. Complete Absence of Legal Basis for Federation

Goode makes no reference to any binding international legal framework (e.g., UN-supervised referendum, plebiscite, or treaty ratified by a self-governing people). The entire conversation is framed in administrative and strategic terms, not legal or human rights terms.

🔴 Flaw: His silence on UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and international norms for decolonisation shows that British colonial authorities were acting in breach of international law—effectively engineering a disguised transfer of colonial authority from London to Kuala Lumpur.

🔍 7. Brunei’s Opposition as a Red Flag

He notes that Azahari had mobilised Bruneian public opinion against Malaysia, and that the Sultan was hesitant to proceed. The Brunei Revolt (December 1962) occurred just months after this letter, showing that Goode vastly underestimated the depth of opposition to Malaysia in Borneo.

🔴 Flaw: This weakens the claim that there was widespread support for Malaysia, and highlights that British assessments were flawed, dismissive, or politically biased. Brunei’s rejection of Malaysia also invalidates claims of a unified regional desire for federation.

🔍 8. No Reference to the Manila Accord (1963)

The letter pre-dates the Manila Accord (July 1963), but it reveals that British policy was already moving ahead without safeguards for self-determination. When the Manila Accord later called for the “free and voluntary expression of the will of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak,” it was reactive, not proactive—a diplomatic cover for an already illegitimate process.

🔴 Flaw: The failure to build in genuine mechanisms for consent—such as a referendum—before negotiating federation terms, is a core violation of international treaty law and decolonisation norms.

✅ Conclusion

Sir William Goode’s letter is important not for what it argues, but for what it reveals:

    • That Malaysia was not a popular demand, but a British–Malayan geopolitical construct to stabilise Singapore and contain Communism.

    • That self-determination was never truly on the table for North Borneo.

    • That the process was guided by colonial manipulation, not democratic consent.

His call for a “transition period” masks a deeper strategy: to prepare the territory not for freedom, but for controlled absorption. Goode’s letter is, ultimately, an early exposé of the illegitimacy of the Malaysia formation process—and provides powerful evidence for legal and moral claims for Sabah and Sarawak’s right to self-determination today.

砂拉越有权独立吗？

各位砂拉越的同胞们，大家好。

SLM：脱马无罪 独立有理

砂拉越有权力独立吗？有或没有

大家知道马来西亚联邦是由砂拉越，沙巴，新加坡和马来亚签署一份国际协议叫马来西亚协议/MA63。 马来亚是一个独立国家然而砂拉越，沙巴和新加坡是还没独立的国家。 因此这砂拉越，沙巴和新加坡根本没有法定资格签署国际协议。 （1） 

在1965年，新加坡退出而独立去了。 （2）

马来西亚就是马来亚的更名。MA63协议延迟到1970年才在联合国登记这是违反联合国宪法。（3）

砂沙参组马联邦60多年，可是马来亚以马联邦的名义不间断的掠夺，剥削，打压，镇压，抢劫，霸凌和殖民咱们。

他们完全不按照MA63条约执行对砂沙任务。所以，今天，咱们看到的实相是马半岛不断的进步和繁荣，但是他们的进步和繁荣是建立在砂沙的贫穷上。 就这一重点已经足够让这协议无效。（4）

更不用说他们把MA63修改了600多次。这是国际协议，哪里可以由马来亚为主的政府如此任意修改。这是另一个因素让这协议无效。（5）

MA63完全是英国政府以马来亚为中心的策划根本就违法联合国在1960年12月14日大会通过【去殖民化宣言】1514号决议的自决权和1541号决议的集体决定权的国际法。

完全不给砂沙人民公投下，把这两家殖民地强硬的加入马来亚来扩展该国的土地，完全违反联合国【去殖民化宣言】的宪章。 （6）

在MA63条款中，没有限定砂沙退出马联邦。因此，砂沙人民有1514和1541或1441决定权退出。 （7）

Does Sarawak have the right to be independent? Yes or No

As we all know that the Malaysia Agreement/MA63 is an international agreement signed by Sarawak, Sabah, Singapore (SSS) and Malaya when Malaya was an independent country whereas SSS were not yet independent to have the locus standi to sign the treaty. (1)

In 1965, when Singapore withdrew, it also rendered MA63 void. （2）

MA63 was only registered with the United Nations in 1970 and thus they violated the United Nations Constitution. (3)

For over 60 years in the Malaysia Federation (Malaya in disguise), Sarawak and Sabah have continuously been plundered, exploited, oppressed, suppressed, robbed, bullied and colonised.

The Federal government did not act in accordance with the MA63 treaty at all. Thus, we only see the progress and prosperity of Malaya at the expense of the poverty of Sarawak and Sabah, which is enough to invalidate the agreement. (4)

The modification of MA63 over 600 times by the Malayan-dominated government is another factor rendering this agreement invalid. (5)

MA63 is a Malaya-centred plan by the British government and fundamentally violates the international law of the right to self-determination 1514 and the right to collective determination 1541 of the [Declaration of Decolonisation] adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14/12/1960.

Without giving Sabahans and Sarawakians a referendum, the two colonies were forcefully added to Malaya to expand its territory as against the Charter of Declaration of Decolonization of the United Nations (6)

In the terms of MA63, there is no restriction on Sabah and Sarawak withdrawing from the Malaysia Federation. Therefore, Sabahans and Sarawakians have the 1514 and 1541 or 1441 decision to withdraw. (7)

Adakah Sarawak mempunyai hak untuk merdeka? Ya atau tidak

Seperti yang kita sedia maklum bahawa Perjanjian Malaysia/MA63 adalah perjanjian antarabangsa yang ditandatangani oleh Sarawak, Sabah, Singapura (SSS) dan Malaya semasa Malaya adalah sebuah negara merdeka sedangkan SSS belum lagi merdeka untuk mempunyai locus standi untuk menandatangani perjanjian tersebut. (1)

Pada tahun 1965, apabila Singapura menarik diri, ia juga menjadikan MA63 tidak sah. （2）

MA63 hanya didaftarkan dengan UN sehingga 1970 dan dengan itu mereka melanggar Perlembagaan UN. (3)

Selama lebih 60 tahun dalam Malaysia (Malaya berselindung), Sarawak sentiasa dirompak, dieksploitasi, ditindas, dirompak, dibuli dan dijajah.

Kerajaan Federal sama sekali tidak bertindak mengikut perjanjian MA63. Justeru secara realitinya, kita hanya melihat kemajuan dan kemakmuran Malaya dengan mengorbankan kemiskinan Sarawak dan Sabah, yang sudah cukup untuk membatalkan perjanjian itu. (4)

Pengubahsuaian MA63 lebih 600 kali oleh kerajaan yang dikuasai Malaya merupakan satu lagi faktor yang menyebabkan perjanjian ini tidak sah. (5)

MA63 ialah rancangan berpusatkan Malaya oleh kerajaan British dan secara asasnya melanggar undang-undang antarabangsa hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri 1514 dan hak untuk penentuan kolektif dalam Resolusi 1541 [Deklarasi Dekolonisasi] yang diterima pakai oleh UN pada 14/12/1960.

Tanpa memberikan rakyat Sabah dan Sarawak referendum, kedua-dua jajahan itu telah ditambah secara paksa ke Tanah Melayu untuk meluaskan wilayahnya bertentangan dengan Piagam Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu/UN [Deklarasi Dekolonisasi]. (6)

Dalam terma MA63, tiada sekatan ke atas Sabah dan Sarawak menarik diri daripada Persekutuan Malaysia. Oleh itu, rakyat Sabah dan Sarawak mempunyai keputusan 1514 dan 1541 atau 1441 untuk menarik diri. (7)

康菲石油退出

康菲石油退出深水油气田项目 罗克强：转变并不是失败

2025年5月1日

https://news.seehua.com/post/1315299

（古晋1日讯）康菲石油（ConocoPhillips）公司最近宣布退出萨拉姆帕塔瓦利(Salam-Patawali)深水油气田项目的消息引发了担忧﹐但有关担忧忽视了一个更重要的事实﹐即是次转变并不是失败﹐而是砂拉越朝着自主掌控经济未来迈出的关键且必要的一步。

砂峇都吉当区立法议员罗克强是以文告方式﹐如是表示。

他说明﹐康菲石油公司最近宣布退出萨拉姆帕塔瓦利深水油气田项目的消息﹐引发了一些人对于投资者信心的质疑﹐特别是在砂拉越透过砂拉越石油公司不断扩大其在油气领域的影响力之际。

“然而﹐是种担忧忽视了一个更重要的事实﹐即是次转变并不是失败﹐而是砂拉越朝着自主掌控经济未来迈出的关键且必要的一步。”

他透露﹐当中需要明确了解的是﹐萨拉姆帕塔瓦利深水油气田项目仍处于可行性评估阶段﹐而那也正是康菲石油公司当前能够退出其与国家石油公司的合作的原因。

“但那并不意味着﹐砂拉越的未来投资之门已经关闭。康菲石油公司将来仍有可能回归﹐而届时﹐应是在代表砂拉越利益的砂石油公司参与下﹐并且是在对砂拉越更为公平的条款基础上进行合作。”

他还建议说﹐一个更公平的合作模式﹐或许可以是砂拉越与康菲石油公司之间的50:50合资企业。

“即便是类似安排﹐砂拉越仍可能象征性地拨出5%份额予联邦政府﹐以作为联邦政府过去50年来‘慷慨’给予砂拉越5%油气收入的一种回馈。毕竟﹐相关油气资源并

非出自马来亚半岛的土地与海域﹐而是来自砂拉越自身的领土﹐所以砂拉越愿意让出5%份额﹐已是格外宽厚。”

他称﹐以圭亚那(Guyana)与埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)之间的50:50合资模式为例的话﹐则圭亚那无需在前期投入资金﹐便能透过利润油和特许权使用费获得丰厚回报﹐且随着成本逐步回收﹐其分成比例还会进一步增加。

“砂拉越理应享有不低于类似合作模式的权益。”

他提及﹐在过去50多年里﹐砂拉越在1974年石油发展法令下﹐仅获得5%的石油与天然气现金收益。

“值得注意的是﹐该法令是在紧急状态期间颁布﹐且从未获得砂拉越立法机构﹐即砂立法议会的正式通过。实际上﹐在砂拉越的立法议会记录当中﹐也完全找不到任何有关该法令被审议或通过的记录。”

他遗憾看见﹐尽管砂拉越为国家财政贡献了数以亿计的收入﹐但在基础设施建设与整体发展方面﹐砂拉越却长期处于落后状态。

“联邦政府拨款一直严重不足﹐尤其是与砂拉越幅员辽阔的地理条件﹐以及复杂的交通物流需求相比下﹐更显得分配极不合理。在过去半个世纪﹐我们奉献了高达95%的石油与天然气资源﹐却换来微不足道的回报。”

与此同时﹐他说明﹐针对1974年石油发展法令之合法性的法律挑战﹐目前仍在进行当中。但在等待法庭裁决前需要强调的是﹐砂拉越拥有早在1958年就已颁布1958年石油开采法令。

“该法令早在1974年石油发展法令通过前存在﹐也是砂拉越主张拥有本土资源监管权的重要法律依据。”

他表示﹐无论法院最终如何裁定﹐有一点毋庸置疑的是﹐砂拉越理应在自身天然资源的管理与收益分配中﹐发挥更重要﹑更主导的角色。

“倘若国油公司能够与国际企业组建合资公司并共同运营油田﹐那砂石油公司一旦具备同样开展类似合作的正当性与潜力的话也同样可以﹐而当中的关键就在于加强自身的能力建设﹐以及战略合作伙伴关系的开展。”

他续称﹐在许多现有的合资项目中﹐即便国油公司拥有50%股权﹐但实际的运营工作往往仍由蚬标公司或康菲石油公司等国际公司负责执行。

“既然技术执行主要由外国合作方负责﹐那砂石油公司作为砂拉越的代表﹐就完全有能力直接与他们接洽与谈判﹐又何须再由国油公司代为出面？毕竟﹐国油公司并不是技术成功的必要条件。”

他指出﹐油气行业仍是全球最具利润与竞争力的领域之一﹐所以即便康菲石油公司选择退出﹐其他的企业也势必会接踵而至﹐特别是在砂拉越展现出开放﹑透明﹑公平且互利的投资环境之下。

“那不是一种对抗﹐而是一场转型。它立足于公平﹑宪政合法性﹐以及砂拉越人民欲根据1963年马来西亚立国契约所拥有的合理权利﹐即自主掌控自身资源。”

他还强调﹐在经历了马来亚数十年的边缘化对待之后﹐当前正是砂拉越重拾其对本土陆地与海域资源主权的关键时刻。

“正因如此﹐砂拉越总理拿督巴丁宜阿邦佐哈里呼吁人民无视外界的讥讽与质疑﹐而那不仅合理﹐更是必要的。在他的带领下﹐砂政党联盟政府正稳步推进一系列理性﹑具前瞻性且诚信的战略方针﹐以切实符合砂拉越的长远发展利益。”

他直言﹐任由外界冷嘲热讽﹐砂拉越都将坚定前行。

“我们正勇敢而果断地﹐迈向一个由自己主宰命运的未来。”

An Open Letter to Premier Abang Jo

*An Open Letter to Premier Abang Zohari and the Sarawak GPS Government: A Betrayal of Trust, A Failure of Leadership*  

Dear Premier Abang Zohari Openg and the Sarawak GPS State Government,  

Trust you are keeping well and safe.

We, the people of Sarawak, write to you not with malice, but with profound disappointment and anger. 

For decades, Sarawakians have been fed promises of *"restoring, defending, and protecting Sarawak’s rights"* under the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). 

Yet, the recent capitulation to Putrajaya over the Petroleum Development Act 1974 (PDA74) and the ownership of Sarawak’s oil and gas resources reveals a truth we can no longer ignore: *your words ring hollow, and your actions betray Sarawak*.  

*Broken Promises, Broken Trust*  

You pledged to continue the legacy of the late Chief Minister Adenan Satem (“Tok Nan”), who declared that *"Sarawak’s relationship with the Federal Government must be “constitutionally correct.”* 

Tok Nan’s defiance against federal overreach inspired hope that Sarawak would finally reclaim what is rightfully ours under MA63: *autonomy over our resources*.  

Yet, today, we witness the opposite. 

By conceding to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s assertion that PDA74 remains unchallenged and “business as usual,” you have surrendered Sarawak’s constitutional leverage. 

Law Minister Azalina Othman’s revelation—that Sarawak *“acknowledged and recognized”* PDA74 during closed-door talks—confirms this betrayal. 

How can you reconcile this with your own legal advisors’ stance that PDA74 was enacted *“in secrecy,”* *“unconstitutionally,”* and in violation of MA63?  

*The Petros Mirage: A Symbol of Surrender* 

The creation of Petros was hailed as a breakthrough, a vehicle for Sarawak to reclaim control of its oil and gas. 

Instead, it has become a fig leaf, masking Sarawak’s subservience to Petronas. 

*PM Anwar’s statement—that Petros is merely a “gas aggregator” (excluding LNG, Sarawak’s most lucrative resource)—exposes the grim reality: Sarawak remains a spectator rather than a gladiator in its own house*.  

*You claim PDA74 and the Sarawak Oil Mining Ordinance 1958 (OMO58) can “co-exist,” but this legal ambiguity serves only Petronas and Kuala Lumpur.*

*By refusing to pursue a definitive judicial resolution or parliamentary repeal of PDA74, you have chosen political convenience over constitutional justice*.  

*NATO Leadership: No Action, Talk Only*  

Your partners/colleagues' defense—that opposition figures like Chong Chieng Jen “did nothing”—is a red herring. 

Sarawakians entrusted *you* with an overwhelming mandate. GPS dominates the state assembly and holds pivotal federal influence. Yet, when leverage mattered most, you folded.  

Worse, you dismissed critics as “politicizing the issue,” while offering no substantive rebuttal to Azalina’s damning admission. 

If PDA74 is unconstitutional, why not challenge it in court? 

If MA63 guarantees our resource rights, why concede ownership to Petronas? 

*Silence is complicity.*  

*A Legacy of Failure*  

Tok Nan warned: *“Do not underestimate the people’s intelligence.”* 

Sarawakians are not fools. We see through the theatrics. 

The late Chief Minister fought to delist Sarawak as a “state” in federal documents, asserting our equal partnership. Today, you have reduced Sarawak to a supplicant, begging for crumbs from Petronas’ table.  

Your predecessors traded Sarawak’s resources for “thirty pieces of silver.” You, however, have done worse: *legitimizing theft by validating PDA74*. This is not leadership—it is submission.  

*Our Demands: Action, Not Apologies* 

Sarawakians do not seek hollow slogans or blame games. We demand:  

1. *Immediate legal action* to challenge PDA74’s constitutionality in court, as your own legal advisors insist it violates MA63.  

2. *Parliamentary motion* to repeal or amend PDA74, leveraging GPS’s influence in the unity government.  

3. *Transparency* in all negotiations with Putrajaya—no more secret deals that sell out Sarawak.  

Premier Abang Zohari, you once vowed that GPS would *“fight to the death”* for Sarawak’s rights. Today, your words are ashes. If you will not act, please graciously step aside for leaders who will.  

*Sarawak’s oil and gas belong to Sarawakians. This is non-negotiable.* 

*We will not forget the betrayals of Fairland Sarawak*  

 

*Fairland Sarawak*  

*On behalf of Sarawakians Who Believe in Justice as 'an equal founding partner in the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia'.*

*If not now, when ?*

*If not us Sarawakians, who else ?*

*WE ❤️ SARAWAK !!!*

*Jaga Sarawak bait-bait*

*Anak-Anak Sarawak*

*LAK-SA63*

*21/2/2025*

*Note: This letter is a collective expression of frustration from Sarawakians who expected their leaders to prioritize the state’s constitutional rights over political expediency.* 

*The fight for MA63 is not partisan—it is existential.*

The Darker Side of UMNO

*The Darker Side of UMNO* 

(23/9/2020)

Why are Petronas Accounts Secret ?

Ex-Petronas Boss ( Tengku Razaleigh Petronas Chairman 1981-2011 ) reveals $1.4 trillion handed to UMNO, over 30 years, as long suspected.

Petronas made 90 billion profits a year, for the past 30 years.

 

Tengku Razaleigh revealed that Petronas has given to UMNO a 40 billion a year for the past 30 years, amounting to a mind boggling RM1.2 trillions ( 1200 billions).

What happen to all the money ?

Now you know why politicians and suporters want an all Malay Government , to continue to plunder the country's wealths ( mainly from Sarawak and Sabah ) and remain in power.

 *巫统的阴暗面* 

（2020 年 9 月 20 日）

为什么马来西亚国家石油公司的账目是秘密的？

前马来西亚国家石油公司老板（Tengku Razaleigh）透露，正如人们长期以来所怀疑的那样，30 年来有 1.4 万亿美元被交给了巫统。

过去 30 年，Petronas 每年盈利 900 亿令吉。

Tengku Razaleigh 透露，Petronas 在过去 30 年里每年给巫统 4​​00 亿令吉，总额高达 1.2 万亿令吉（12000 亿令吉）。

这些钱都去哪儿了？

现在你应该会知道为什么政客和他们的支持者想要一个全马来人的政府，方便继续攫掠国家的财富（主要来自砂拉越和沙巴）并继续掌权。

The dead horse theory

From Mosses P Anap RSNB Ngo

*The Horse Dead Theory in Relation to the Invalidity of MA63*

The Horse Dead Theory is a metaphor that means when something no longer serves its purpose, it is pointless to keep using or trying to fix it. Instead, one should acknowledge its failure and move on. Applying this to the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) helps illustrate why Sabah and Sarawak should stop relying on it and seek a new path—independence.

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1. MA63 is a “Dead Horse” Because It Is No Longer Valid

A horse is considered “dead” when it no longer functions as intended. Similarly, MA63 was supposed to be the legal framework that formed Malaysia, but its legal and political foundation has collapsed over time. Here’s why:

a) MA63 Was Violated Repeatedly

 • The Malaysian government has consistently ignored or broken the terms of MA63.

 • Sabah and Sarawak were promised equal status with Malaya, but they were downgraded to mere states within Malaysia.

 • Autonomy rights, revenue-sharing agreements, and Borneo’s special privileges were gradually eroded by federal laws.

 • If the agreement has not been honored for decades, how can it still be considered valid?

b) The Departure of Singapore in 1965 Rendered MA63 Invalid

 • MA63 was a multilateral agreement between Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore to form Malaysia.

 • When Singapore left in 1965, the structure of Malaysia changed without consulting Sabah and Sarawak.

 • This violated the basic legal principle that any change in a multilateral treaty requires the consent of all parties.

 • If MA63 was altered without agreement, it is no longer legally binding.

c) Malaysia’s Request to Amend MA63 Was Rejected by the British Government

 • Malaysia tried to seek British approval to amend the terms of MA63, but the British government rejected the request.

 • This shows that even the original colonial power does not recognize the legitimacy of Malaysia’s legal claims over Sabah and Sarawak.

 • If even Britain sees the flaws in MA63, why should Sabahans and Sarawakians believe it can still be used?

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2. Malaysia Keeps “Whipping the Dead Horse” Instead of Accepting Its Failure

Even though MA63 is legally and politically dead, Malaysian leaders continue to act as if it can be revived. This is like whipping a dead horse, hoping it will move.

a) The False Promise of “Restoring MA63”

 • Malaysian politicians keep saying they will “restore Sabah and Sarawak’s rights” under MA63.

 • But how can you restore something that is already legally dead?

 • They use this as a delay tactic to keep Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia while making minor changes that do not solve the core problem.

b) The 2021 Constitutional Amendment: A Fake Solution

 • In 2021, Malaysia amended the Federal Constitution to say that Sabah and Sarawak are now “equal partners” again.

 • But this was just symbolic, with no real power, autonomy, or economic independence.

 • This is like trying to feed a dead horse instead of realizing it’s time to dismount.

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3. The Logical Step: Stop Relying on MA63 and Move Forward

If a horse is dead, the solution is not to keep riding it, but to find a new horse. Similarly, if MA63 is invalid, the solution is not to keep negotiating under Malaysia—it is to pursue full independence.

a) Independence Is the Only Real Solution

 • Since MA63 has collapsed, there is no longer a legal basis for Sabah and Sarawak to remain in Malaysia.

 • Continuing to fight for “better treatment” within Malaysia keeps Sabah and Sarawak trapped in a system designed to exploit them.

 • Just like a rider must find a new horse, Sabah and Sarawak must find a new political status: independence.

b) Relying on MA63 Will Only Waste More Time

 • If people continue believing in a dead agreement, they will delay real progress.

 • Malaysians will keep offering false promises, but the fundamental problem will never be solved.

 • The sooner Sabah and Sarawak dismount from this “dead horse,” the sooner they can build a better future on their own terms.

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Conclusion: Time to Stop Pretending and Take Action

 • MA63 is dead—legally, politically, and practically.

 • Malaysia keeps pretending it’s alive to keep Sabah and Sarawak under its control.

 • Fighting for MA63’s restoration is a waste of time—the only real solution is to leave Malaysia and establish an independent Sabah.

 • The people of Sabah and Sarawak must recognize this reality and move forward boldly.

砂拉越的石油和天然气权利：安华应使用 PDA 下的绝对权力纠正不平衡，因为 1958 年石油开采法令仍然有效，国会议员告诉国会

 

砂拉越的石油和天然气权利：安华应使用 PDA 下的绝对权力纠正不平衡，因为 1958 年石油开采法令仍然有效，国会议员告诉国会

为了将掠食者赶走，我们需要枪支和围栏。为了要求政治海盗不要侵犯我们的自然资源，我们需要执行法律并在法庭上起诉他们。

你认为安华会使用 PDA 下的绝对权力来纠正砂拉越石油和天然气 (O&G) 权利的不平衡吗？

正义是 PKR 的标志。他是否愿意为了自己、党和联邦的利益坚持这一原则并进行纠正？

毫无疑问，砂拉越的马来西亚前石油开采法令 (OMO) 1958 年仍然有效且适用。

安华是否愿意使用 PDA 下的绝对权力来纠正不平衡现象并不在我们的控制范围内。

最重要的是，砂拉越 GPS 政府拥有绝对权力在法庭上起诉马来西亚国家石油公司，指控其拒绝遵守砂拉越法律，因为没有任何联邦法律可以取代 MA63 中规定的条款。

无疑问，砂拉越的石油和天然气活动是邦权利，而马来西亚国家石油公司（Petronas@Malaya）应该面对现实，遵守砂拉越法律，否则就退出，因为PDA永远无法推翻MA63。

PDA 1974是在EO 1969时，在未经砂拉越议会同意下在砂拉越执行。

大多数砂拉越人和沙巴人都知道，2011年废除EO 1969导致PDA 1974在沙砂自动作废。

让法庭主持砂拉越宪法权力在天然气分配方面的法律基础。要求殖民主义思想的联邦海盗公平正义是毫无意义的。国会议员，成熟一点！

这些殖民者从不相信双赢的共同繁荣。

砂拉越人无法再容忍马来西亚天然气分配不平衡，“砂拉越每天生产的天然气总量为45亿标准立方英尺，其中94%由马来西亚国家石油公司出口到国外，而只有60亿标准立方英尺用于砂拉越的能源、工业和家用”。

产量为45亿X 365天=每年16,425亿标准立方英尺。但砂拉越每年只能获得60亿标准立方英尺。

根据威利, 马来亚每天生产的20亿标准立方英尺天然气全部在马半岛使用。

根据1974年PDA第6（1）和（3）条，从事天然气营销和分销的企业必须获得总理的批准，但这砂拉越不必要。

2019年的豁免令（修订）通知确认，管理砂拉越天然气分配的法律是DGO，而不是PDA。 （19/3/25）