Sarawak After 61 Years In The Malaysian Federation: Where To Now? – Analysis
December 29, 2024 0 Comments
By Murray Hunter
Abstract
Sarawak was thrust into a federation, along with Malaya, Singapore, and Sabah (Noth Borneo) on September 16, 1963. Sixty-one years later, Sarawak finds itself still reconning with history, due to continued negotiation with Putra Jaya on the Malaysia Agreement (MA63), and a cultural and political void between itself and peninsula Malaya. There are now a number of contentious issues between Sarawak and Putra Jaya, plus a rebound in Sarawak nationalism which are shaping the region’s future directions. This article will look at these issues and canvas aspirations for further governmental autonomy and/or eventual independence from Malaysia.
Part 1: The past makes the present
On September 4, 1841, the land extending from Tanjung Datu to Samarahan River in north-west Borneo was ceded as a reward by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin of Brunei to James Brooke. Brooke became Rajah and governor for suppressing the rebels against the Sultan of Brunei. The expansion of Sarawak to today’s borders was secured in successive stages with the takeover of Brunei’s territories by the second Rajah Charles Brookes, taking in the districts of Lawas and Limbang by 1917.
The land, known as Sarawak, recognized by the United States in 1850, and Great Britain in 1864, is bordered by Indonesian Kalimantan to the south, Brunei and Sabah to the east, with the shores of the South China Sea running along the north of the territory. In 1888, Great Britain and Sarawak signed a protectorate treaty.
In 1867, a legislative council, formally called the Sarawak General Council was established by Rajah James Brooke in the small fishing village of Bintulu, with 5 British officers, 16 Malay and Melanau community leaders, and Rajah Brooke as the president.
in 1941 proclaimed the Sarawak Constitution, with Nine Cardinal Principles (1) to mark a century of Brooke rule. The aim was to prepare Sarawak for self-rule, where power from Rajah Brooke would be eventually be devolved to the people of Sarawak, as a secular, democratic, and pluralist state.
After the Japanese occupation ended in 1945, the British had planned to consolidate all British colonies in the Malay-archipelago, into what was described as the Malayan Union. With Sarawak’s treasury practically empty after the war, Rajah Vyner Brooke was ‘convinced’ to cede the sovereignty of Sarawak to the British, even though there was already a long-standing protectorate agreement. Amid protests by representatives of the indigenous people, Sarawak, (2) became a crown colony on May 17, 1946.
This wasn’t accepted very well by a number of native teachers and civil servants of Sarawak, who expressed their disappointment through organized protests against cession of Sarawak to the British. This cession of Sarawak was denounced, where the restoration of an independent state under Rajah Brooke was demanded. This led to mass resignations from the civil service in what is now called ‘338’ (the number of native civil servants who resigned).
Civil unrest climaxed on December 3, 1949, where the and commander-in-chief Governor Sir Duncan Stewart was assassinated in Sibu. The two youths that were involved in Stewart’s assignation were convicted of murder and hanged along with two other conspirators, (3) who were believed to be members of a political group, aiming for union which the newly independent Indonesia (Thomson 2016).
The United Nation’s stand against colonialism, and the need for the British to let go of its colonies in the ‘Far East’ by United Nations pressure, eventually led to the independence of Malaya on August 31, 1957, after lengthy negotiations with Tunku Abdul Rahman and group of multi-ethnic leaders. Similarly, negotiations by the British in Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo (now Sabah) continued.
Moving forward to 1962, the Committee for Greater Malaysia or the Cobbold Commission of Inquiry was well aware of opposition to the formation of Malaysia by natives and some political parties, (4) although this was not made clear in the final report. The commission heavily supported the positions of the Malayan prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the chief minister of Singapore Lee Kwan Yew.
There was great concern that the Borneo territories were not ready for self-government, and lacked respect for the rule of law. The members of the Cobbold Commission believed that ‘one man one vote’ in the Far East has not been a wild success, especially with unsophisticated peoples. Subsequently, no plebiscite in North Borneo or Sarawak was ever undertaken.
The Commission made the conclusion that the entry of North Borneo and Sarawak into Malaysia would be in the territories’ best interests. The Commission report had the firm belief that those groups in North Borneo and Sarawak opposed to a merger would eventually dissipate (Cobbold Commission, 1962).
The report ignored the strength of the anti-Malaysia campaign. The Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP) had a membership of 41,386 scattered across Sarawak, with a primary platform to create a sovereign independent nation. Many minority groups feared the domination of a Malaysia by the Malays. (5) The monarch of the nation Malaysia would never come from Sarawak, the national language Bahasa Malaysia, and Islam as the state religion ran all against the tenets of life for a great majority of Sarawakians.
Any independence by merger into Malaysia would not be regarded as any fulfilment of the aspirations of the people for independence. It would merely be a transfer of political power from Great Britain to Malaysia, a continuation of colonialism.
SUPP had concerns that any Malaysian military house more than 300 miles away across the South China Sea would not be adequate in protecting Sarawak. Sarawak could easily make alternative security arrangements with Great Britain (like Brunei later did). In addition, Sarawak had been economically sufficient on its own for hundreds of years, and didn’t need to be part of a greater Malaysia.
Consequently, the Malaysia agreement was considered by SUPP to be detrimental to the interests of the peoples of Sarawak. Moreover, the pledge made by the Crown when Sarawak was ceded to Great Britain by Rajah Brooke, was for Britain to uphold the 1941 Sarawak Constitution and Nine Cardinal Points.
SUPP submitted a memorandum to the Cobbold Commission in the form of a petition, signed by 114,000 Sarawakians. (6) This was supported by public meetings opposing the merger all over Sarawak, which was not reported in the Cobbold Commission Report. Tunku Abdul Rahman took the opportunity to paint SUPP as a communist influenced organization.
In December 1962 after uprisings in Brunei, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, decreed that Brunei would not join the Federation of Malaysia. In Sarawak, British authorities, undertook a country-wide sweep, leading to the arrest and detention of 6,000 ‘subversives’ suspected of being against the formation of Malaysia. Around 1,500 youths fled across the border to Kalimantan, Indonesia to begin a guerilla war of liberation.
On July 22, 1963, Sarawak’s first chief minister Stephen Kalong Ningkan, was sworn in by the Governor Sir Alexander Waddell. Five Assembly members were then sworn in as council members. This was self-government, but has been reframed as pseudo independence (The Borneo Post, 2015) by the former chief minister, the late Adenan Satem in 2016. The day has been officially gazetted as a holiday, which became known as ‘Sarawak Independence Day’ (Goh, 2016).
Just before the formation of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines requested that the support of the people of the Borneo territories be ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, through a referendum, by the United Nations. A nine person UN Mission travelled to Kuching in August 1963, and was met by demonstrations against the merger into Malaysia. The UN group saw signs of resistance to the merger all around Sarawak as they travelled. The UN team on September 2, reached the conclusion, based upon a ‘grassroot survey’ that the people of Sarawak were pro-Malaysia. (7) It found little evidence of articulate and organized opposition to the Federation, which quelled Indonesian and Philippine disquiet.
The proclamation of Malaysia didn’t achieve the August 31 target to coincide with Malayan independence day, and the Federation of Malaysia came into being on September 16, 1963. According to a telegram dated August 21, 1963 Tunku Abdul Rahman caused resentment in both Jesselton (now Kota Kinabalu) and Kuching on the news that Sabah and Sarawak would only be states in the new Federation, alongside the other states in the peninsula. (8)
After 61 years in the Malaysian Federation, Sarawak has contributed more to the nation’s revenue, through oil and gas, than it has received. While the peninsula is almost fully developed with a good road system, and modern infrastructure, Sarawak’s roads and infrastructure outside of major towns is very poor. In terms of absolute poverty, Sarawak ranks third in Malaysia, after Sabah at 19.5 percent, Kelantan at 12.4 percent, and Sarawak at 9 percent, on 2019 figures (Koh, 2023).
To Sarawak’s benefit, the historical, demographic, language, and cultural differences with the peninsula have spared the territory the race tainted political and Islamic fervour, wrapped up in Malaysia nationalism or Ketuanan Melayu. Such politics is not practiced in Sarawak. Peninsula based political parties only hold two seats in the Sarawak State Assembly.
Unlike Sabah, where migrants were assisted in a clandestine program, in what was dubbed “Project IC” to assist on influencing elections, Sarawak with a population of 2,907,500 (at 2020) is largely unaffected by migration, except from Kalimantan, where the culture is similar. There is an estimated 138,027 foreign workers from Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar, China, and India, under a controlled immigration program (Lumayang, 2020).
Dr Johan Ariffin Samad, the former executive director of the Sabah based think tank Institute of Development Studies (IDS) said in a CNA interview that “the two states (Sabah & Sarawak) have been relegated to the sidelines of the nation’s decision-making process” (Aqil and Bedi, 2024). Samad felt there was a blatant disregard of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), the legal document that forms the basis of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. Sarawak’s Parti Bumi Kanyalang (PBK) president Voon Lee Shun puts the above argument much stronger when he says “Sabah and Sarawak and are in-fact ‘colonies’ of Malaya, and Malaya is in control of power – education, health, Government service, economy, social life, politics and Religion” (New Sarawak Tribune 2021).
The major source of contention between Kuching and Putra Jaya has been the MA63. The MA63 guarantees autonomy for Sarawak, but there is disappointment by some professional and educated people, that this was not honoured by the Federal Government, over the last 61 years.
The MA63, recognises Sabah and Sarawak as equal partners with Malaya in the formation of Malaysia, but Sabah and Sarawak have been treated as mere states. Article 1 (2) of the Malaysian Constitution still lists Sabah and Sarawak as states, alongside other states in the Peninsula.
Negotiations on MA63 between Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal government are ongoing, where both Sabah and Sarawak want increased financial autonomy, with a 40 percent share of revenue collected, and a much larger number of seats in the current 222 member Dewan Rakyat or lower house. Currently, Sabah has 25 seats and Sarawak 31 seats. This is perhaps one of the very few issues Sabah and Sarawak are politically unified on the point of wanting Borneo to have 35 percent of the seats in the Dewan Rakyat.
Other contentions with Putra Jaya concern control of the continental shelf of Sarawak. Currently, Sarawak has rights over a 3 (5.3km) nautical mile limit from the shores, where the Federal government controls the rights the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) reaching 200 nautical miles (371km) from shore. At stake are oil and gas reserves and future revenues. Sarawak possesses at least 800 million barrels of proven oil reserves, with recent discoveries extending this figure greatly. This accounts for more than 60 percent of Malaysia’s oil and gas reserves. Sarawak’s Premier Abang Johari Openg has given The Malaysia national oil and gas producer until October 1, 2024 to come to an agreement with Sarawak. At the time of writing, Petronas is seeking a court injunction to delay the deadline (Battersby 2024).
Sarawak holds 90 percent of Petronas gas stocks, and the Sarawak state-owned Petroleum Sarawak Berhad (Petros) is now the sole gas aggregator, pushing Petronas out of buying and selling gas in Sarawak.
Sarawak is relying upon a state law, the Oil and Gas Mining Ordinance 1958, which was passed before the formation of Malaysia in 1963. The Sarawak government is claiming this law is still in force. The federal government has left this issue to Petronas to settle.
A change in the balance of power nexus
In November 2022, the balance of power dramatically changed between Kuching and Putra Jaya after the last general election. With the general election resulting in a hung parliament, the first of its kind in Malaysian federal election history, the support of Sarawak’s Gabunan Parti Sarawak (GPS) coalition with 23 parliamentary seats was necessary to create a stable federal administration under prime minister Anwar Ibrahim.
This forced Anwar, to make a number of concessions to the Borneo parties. For the first time in federal history, a deputy prime minister position was given to Fadillah Yusof, a member of Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), a member of the GPS coalition. Ten out of 43 minister came from Borneo (8 from Sarawak), and 13 out of 35 deputy ministers (6 from Sarawak) came from Borneo. This gave the Borneo parties, particularly Sarawak an unprecedented position in the federal government in recognition of being the kingmaker in the formation of the Anwar government.
Sarawak has not been slow to use its position to takeover powers and responsibilities at state level. With a perceptively weak prime minister, the current Sarawak state government has pushed back on a federal government directive to use Bahasa Malaysia in the civil service, and strongly stated that the Sarawak government would continue to utilise English as the official medium (FMT Reporters, 2024). Sarawak would also create its own school assessments (FMT Reporters (a) 2024), and is on-track to provide free higher education at Sarawak owned universities in 2026 (Tawie, 2024).
In addition, Sarawak has taken over an airline MASwings to begin operations at the end of 2024 (Curran, 2024), finalising conditions for the takeover of Bintulu Port from the Federal Government (Tawie (a), 2024), and negotiating the purchase of Affin Bank (Bernama, 2024) to specifically serve the needs of Sarawak. Under Sarawak’s own immigration jurisdiction, the state has developed its own expatriate migration program, called Sarawak Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) to compete with the Federal program to attract expatriate retirees (Ling, undated).
Such initiatives would have not been possible under previous federal governments. Political analysts differ on their views about how far the Sarawak government can push the current Anwar administration, where one pundit believes the recent pledges of loyalty from six opposition Bersatu MPs to the government, would enable the Anwar administration to survive anymore pressure from Abang Johari’s government in Kuching (annon., 2024).
Part 3: The way ahead for Sarawak
Many consider the MA63 agreement the major stumbling block between Kuching and Putra Jaya. Lina Soo, President of the Sarawak People’s Aspiration Party (SPAP) describes the MA63 as “a broken mirror, which cannot be patched up to serve its purpose of providing a good reflection”, metaphorical of a broken-down relationship which can’t be healed or salvaged. (9)
UMNO vice president Mohamad Hasan (Tok Mat) said a new Malaysia Agreement is the best approach to restore the rights and interests of Sabah and Sarawak (FMT, 2022). The Democratic Action Party mentor Lim Kit Siang went even further saying there should be a complete reappraisal of all federal-state relations, greater decentralization, and autonomy from Putra Jaya. (10) There have also been suggestions of Borneo having ‘veto power’ in some way or the other in the federal parliament (Sarawak Rose, 2024).
Such a new agreement, according to Soo would be far sighted and potentially change the dynamics between Sarawak and Putra Jaya. A new agreement may solve much political instability. This could be an opportunity for a new Malaysia that not just Sarawakians hope for. (11)
Sarawak’s future options
There are three major options ahead for Sarawak;
1. No change, just stay the same
The vote on constitutional amendments and changing the status of Sabah and Sarawak from Negri or state to Wilayah or region is more symbolic than any great substance. What is more important are the MA63 discussions now ongoing.
However, the inertia for the status quo is now being challenged by the Sarawak state government itself. The moves it has been taking over the last couple of years indicate this. Increased pressure by PBB on peninsula based political parties like Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which holds two state seats not to run in the coming Sarawak state election, due in 2026 is increasing.
Issues that prevent Sarawak further developing economically are additional push factors against the inertia of just staying the same.
A major structural problem is the domestic economy. The local economy lacks enough diversity to provide sufficient jobs for Sarawak’s youth. This forces Sarawakians to travel to the peninsula or Singapore in search of jobs, due to lack of industry, and well-rounded and growing agricultural and SME sectors. In addition, lack of agricultural development beyond corporate owned plantations brings food security issues to Sarawak (Rosni & Hunter, 2014, pp. 23-30).
Sarawak lacks competitive merchant shipping to enable the state trade with the rest of the world. A National Cabotage (12) policy was introduced into Malaysia in the 1980s, mandating all ships plying Malaysian ports must be registered in Malaysia, where foreign vessels cannot off-load or on-load cargo except in Port Klang in the peninsula. The need to trans-ship goods greatly stifles the potential future economic growth, due to these increased costs. Exports and imports into and out of Sarawak are unnecessarily expensive, preventing both the development of a domestic private economic sector and international trade (Wong PPM, 2023, P. 39).
“No change, just staying the same” will depend on Sabah and Sarawak remaining as “king makers” in federal politics. This will greatly depend upon whether the Malay vote remains split between Perikatan Nasional (PN) and Pakatan Harapan-UMNO in the next federal election due by 2027.
2. Secession-independence
The nomenclature, secession or independence, depends upon one’s interpretation of history, something beyond this review. Much has been written about this subject. An independent Sarawak would remain just a romantic sentimental notion, unless the economics can be substantiated. Only a small number of urban middle-class and professionals inside of Sarawak strongly support the secession option, fuelled on by a vocal diaspora domiciled in cities like London, Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide.
In addition, national defence must now be considered a major issue with the Chinese Coast Guard regularly in Sarawak’s waters (Bernama (a), 2024).
Another facto
